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The history and performance of concept stocks 
(Abstract) 
 
This study investigates the performance of firms with extremely high levels of market to sales value (“concept 
stocks”).  To many observers, these stocks appear overvalued.  However, proponents argue that because of 
their unique characteristics, traditional pricing models fail to value these firms correctly.  Ex post, the debate 
can be resolved through an analysis of the long term performance of concept stocks.  En route to testing the 
implied overpricing hypothesis we document several important findings.  First, the identity and characteristics 
of concept stocks have changed markedly over time.  Although the obvious recent examples are internet and 
biotech stocks, concept stocks vary widely by industry over the past four decades.  The industries containing 
the most popular concept stocks evolve from oil and gas extraction in the 60s and 70s, to computer and office 
equipment in the 80s, and to computer-related services in the 90s.  Second, although concept stocks tend to be 
young, small, growth stocks in the 90s, they exhibit a wide range of characteristics throughout the sample 
period.  Third, the relative pricing of concept stocks (compared to either a control sample or the entire 
population) has changed dramatically over time.  The average concept stock sold for approximately three 
times sales in the late 60s and 70s, five times sales in the 80s and nearly 17 times sales in the 90s.  Finally, we 
find evidence supporting the overpricing hypothesis.  Concept stocks underperform significantly in the long 
run.  This underperformance is more severe for Nasdaq firms and in the most recent two decades.  The results 
are separate from glamour, IPO, industry, or contrarian effects and remain after an extensive sensitivity 
analysis. 
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The history and performance of concept stocks 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
“You could tell it was a concept stock because the financials were so bad. …The market 
capitalization was out of proportion to everything but management’s promises.”1
 
Concept stocks are generally defined as stocks with extremely high market to sales ratios.  The term 
“concept” relates to the suggestion that investors need to buy into the concept or idea of a company to 
understand what would otherwise appear to be a high valuation.2  The most obvious recent examples are 
Internet and biotechnology stocks.3  Concept stocks, however, are not new to the economy.  Indeed, the quote 
above was written over a decade ago about Fuddruckers, a hamburger chain!  In spite of their frequent 
mention in the financial press, we know little about the industry distribution, firm characteristics, and long run 
performance of concept stocks.  At the first glance, one might expect that concept stocks are primarily young, 
small, growth stocks.  Empirical examination, however, indicates that this is not the case.  In sections 2 and 3 
we show that only 50% of concept stocks are considered growth stocks and that they distribute almost evenly 
in each size decile.  Although concept stocks do exhibit significantly higher R&D expenditures, they are 
otherwise more heterogeneous in terms of characteristics than is typically suggested.   
To some observers, the prices of concept stocks are far beyond any reasonable relation to the 
expectation of future earnings or cash flows.  In fact, the companies represented by concept stocks often have 
little or no positive earnings to evaluate.  Concept stocks are typically defined by the ratio of market to sales 
for the specific reason that metrics such as the price-earnings ratios are meaningless for companies with 
negative earnings.  
                                                     
1 Frederick E. Rowe Jr., “Don’t Get Mad, Go Short.”  Forbes, June 25, 1990. 
2 For example, John C.  Boggle Jr.  President of Boggle Investment Management, states: “ the more overpriced a stock is, 
the more overpriced it can become.  There is no sensible metric for valuing” concept stocks.  See: “If ‘concept stocks’ 
are stuff dreams are made on, does a rude awakening loom?” Heard On The Street, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 17 2000. 
3 A partial list of the literature examining the pricing of Internet stocks includes Cooper, Dimitrov and Rau (2001), 
Trueman, Wong and Zhang (2001), Demers and Lev (2000), Cornell and Liu (2000), Hand (2000) and Ofek and 
Richardson (2003). 
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  Proponents of these stocks argue that you must buy the “concept” in order to understand their 
valuation. The concept typically relates to unforeseen future earnings that would justify the current price.4 
One justification is that because of unusually high levels of R&D, advertising or capital expenditures, these 
firms are difficult to value but have the potential for dramatically higher future returns.    Lev and Sougiannis 
(1996) find a positive relationship between R&D and subsequent stock returns.  Their results are interpreted 
as either a rational compensation for risks unidentified by existing asset-pricing models or a systematic 
mispricing for firms with more intangible assets.  On the other hand, Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis 
(2002) show that there is no direct link between investments in R&D and future stock returns.  Firms with 
high R&D earn an average return similar to those without R&D.  A recent study by Titman, Wei, and Xie 
(2001) provides evidence that firms with high capital expenditures earn lower benchmark-adjusted stock 
returns, a result primarily driven by the over-investment problem.  Obviously, the evidence is mixed.   
Disagreements over the valuation of concept stocks can be resolved by examining future 
performance.  Two hypotheses are implied.  The first is that the pricing of concept stocks accurately reflects 
the dynamics of their economic fundamentals.  Apparent mispricings are instead rational compensation for 
risks unidentified by existing pricing models  (e.g. Fama-French (1993)).5   
The second hypothesis is that concept stocks represent fads in market pricing.  That is, for particular 
reasons, certain stocks receive valuations that are out of proportion with the rest of the market.  Some 
investors tend to get overly excited about owning those “trendy” stocks regardless of their past performance.  
La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), for example, argue for behavioral explanations.  Shiller 
(1999) cites “Irrational Exuberance.”  Along these lines, investors overprice securities because they 
inappropriately extrapolate high growth rates or underestimate the riskiness of a stock.6  Under the fad or 
behavioral interpretation, the subsequent performance of concept stocks is predicted to be dismal.   
                                                     
4 A variation is that traditional methods, or the parameters used in these methods are inappropriate.  For example, it has 
been argued that the risk premium utilized to discount expected cash flows from technology stocks is too high.   
5 Other related literature includes Dreman and Berry (1995) who examine price earnings ratios and investor overreaction. 
6 See Hirshleifer (2001) for an extensive review of psychology and asset pricing. 
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The question, “Are concept stocks overvalued?” is an empirical one, tested by examining operating 
and stock performance in the long run.  We define concept stocks as stocks in the extreme decile ranked by 
the market to sales ratio.  Unlike asset pricing tests using variables like book to market or firm size, we are 
not inherently interested in the market to sales ratio itself.  We use this ratio merely as a tool, enabling us to 
empirically identify concept stocks.  Our objective is a detailed analysis of the characteristics of concept 
stocks and a thorough test of the pricing (or mis-pricing) of these stocks rather than a cross sectional analysis 
of the predictability of future stock returns implied by the entire range of a particular ratio.7     
In the process of testing these hypotheses we document several noteworthy results.  First, the types of 
firms identified as concept stocks have changed dramatically over the past three decades.  This is true of their 
industrial composition as well as their financial characteristics.  We find that a typical concept stock is larger 
in terms of market value, younger and less profitable than a comparable control firm.  In addition, the specific 
characteristics of concept firms have varied considerably over time.   
Second, the relative valuation of a typical concept stock has increased sharply over time.  The typical 
concept stock sells for three times sales in the late 60s and 70s, five times sales in the 80s, nearly seventeen 
times sales in the 90s and forty-five times sales by the last year in our sample, 1999.   A typical control firm 
sells for 1.2 times sales at the beginning of our sample period and only 1.36 times sales at the end.  Third, 
while more than 95% of concept stocks have positive earnings near the beginning of our sample, less than 
40% have positive earnings near the end of our sample.  In terms of market value, concept stocks tend to be 
larger than average CRSP firms.  Concept firms, however, are significantly smaller than the typical CRSP or 
matched firms in terms of book value.  Fourth, the long run performance of concept stocks is negative relative 
to control firms.  This result holds no matter whether measured by Fama-French (1993) factors or buy and 
hold returns.  Further analysis shows that the underperformance of concept stocks is more severe for Nasdaq 
firms and during the recent two decades.  Fifth, consistent with street wisdom, concept stocks have higher 
levels of research and development and greater capital expenditures than comparison firms.  Our study 
                                                     
7 Several studies (for example, Liao and Chou (1995), Barbee et al. (1996) and O’Shaughnessy (1998)) investigate the 
cross-sectional predictability of equity returns based on the market to sales ratio.   
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indicates that although concept stocks are R&D-intensive firms, they are less profitable than an average firm.  
However, in contrast to the high R&D firms examined in Titman, Wei, and Xie (2001), the under-
performance in our study is unlikely to be driven by the over-investment problem associated with a higher 
level of free cash flows.  This is because concept firms usually do not have positive cash flows.  Interestingly, 
when we use financial and other firm-specific variables to explain the underperformance of concept stocks, 
we find that firms with high R&D expenditures perform better than those with lower R&D expenses.  Finally, 
after controlling for the glamour, contrarian, or equity issuance effects, the under-performance of concept 
stocks is still significant; the concept effect is not a metaphor for those effects.8
Because so little is documented about concept stocks we begin with a descriptive analysis of concept 
stocks followed by a formal test of the overpricing hypothesis.  Section 2 describes the data and the sample 
selection procedure.  The identity and financial characteristics of concept stocks are discussed in Section 3. 
Section 4 examines the overpricing hypothesis, testing the relative performance of concept stocks in terms of 
both accounting and rates of return. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Sample Selection 
2.1 Defining concept stocks  
 As with the “value vs. glamour” and contrarian literature, we need a simple objective criterion to 
identify concept stocks over time.  To understand how markets describe concept stocks, we search Dow Jones 
News Retrieval for relevant new articles over the past thirty three years (1967-1999).  The process is detailed 
in Appendix A.  Table A summarizes some of the key quotes from the search.  It is apparent from Table A 
that the market’s interest in concept stocks is not just a recent phenomenon.  Moreover, the concepts, 
companies and industries identified in these articles are diverse and changing over time.  The specific 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
8 One possible explanation for our results comes from a recent theoretical model by Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam (2001).  In their model, some investors are overconfident about their abilities to interpret the quality of 
information they have about the values of securities.  The implication from investor overconfidence is that the stocks 
traded by those informed, overconfident individuals eventually under-perform in the long run.  In addition, the problem 
of investor misvaluation could be more severe for firms with fewer tangible assets.  Concept stocks are ideal candidates 
to suffer from such misvaluation since they tend to be younger and more R&D-intensive than other firms in the market. 
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concepts identified by these articles include discussions of “exciting business ideas” such as “improved 
management of doctors by doctors” or “the warehousing notion”.  Some articles cite buying patterns: “baby 
boomers with money to invest purchasing the stocks they knew as children.”  Other articles cite “inherent 
quality” or “under-valuation” or “long-term inflation hedges.”  Most articles appear skeptical of concept 
stocks.  In a classic rebuke of concept stocks, David Dremen notes in Forbes that “Netscape is trading at a 
P/E of 375 and America Online at 41.  One is discounting the hereafter, the other is discounting eternity.”9
  These articles frequently describe concept stocks as those with extreme market to sales ratios.  
Rather than focus on an ad hoc set of newsworthy stocks, we define concept stocks using this objective ratio.  
An alternate measure, like price to earnings, fails because it does not recognize firms with negative earnings.  
The market to sales ratio also differs from the market to book ratio (used in the “value vs. glamour” literature) 
in that its numerator is an active flow measure, rather than a static, historical variable.  The book value of 
equity used in market to book ratios is also affected by accounting methods such as depreciation and 
inventory.     
To identify concept stocks, we begin with the intersection of all non-financial firms listed on the 
CRSP monthly return files and the merged Compustat annual industrial files for each of the years 1965-99.  
To ensure that the accounting variables are known before the return variables, we match the accounting data 
for all firms which have fiscal yearends in months January to May in calendar year t-1 with their returns in 
calendar year t.  We further delete the firms with average stock prices less than $5 during the selection year to 
avoid micro structure or liquidity concerns.  This also avoids the problem of extreme outliers created by very 
low stock prices.  Results including these stocks (available upon request) are similar.  For remaining firms we 
calculate the ratio of sales to the market value of equity at the calendar year end.  Concept stocks are defined 
as firms in the highest market to sales decile at the end of the each calendar year.  Thus, they comprise the 91st 
through 100th percentile of firms ranked in order of the market to sales ratio and redefined each year. We 
                                                     
9 David Dreman, “Hot spots in a cool market”, Forbes, 1/1/1996. 
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choose this definition to create a consistent, objective definition of concept stocks.10  Nevertheless, we find 
that our sample matches well with concept stocks subjectively identified by various authors in the financial 
press.  Of the 88 firms subjectively identified as concept stocks in Appendix A, 73 are listed in the 
CRSP/Compustat universe.  We find that 74% of these firms are included in our sample.  Over the earlier 
years (1973 to 1990), we find 63% (19 of 30) in our sample.  Over the last decade, 81% (35 of 43) of concept 
stocks identified in the financial press appear in our sample.  
2.2 The relationship between concept stocks and glamour/small stocks 
One might expect that our methodology selects firms that overlap with a sample based on book-to-
market and/or size.  The latter sample has been studied extensively in the size/value/glamour literature 
including analyses by Banz (1981), Fama and French (1993) and La Porta et al. (1994, 1997), among others.  
We check for the magnitude and impact of any overlap in several ways.  First, the correlation between market 
to book and market to sales is a low 0.07 for the sample we will identify as concept stocks.   
Second, following the standard procedure performed in numerous studies in the literature, we sort 
stocks into deciles each year using all sample firms with positive book equity.  The sorting variable is either 
size or book-to-market.  We then calculate the fraction of concept stocks in each of the deciles.  Figure 4a 
shows that the percentage of concept stocks falling into the smallest book-to-market decile ranges from 36% 
to 69% with an average of 50%.  Thus, concept stocks that could be classified as glamour stocks comprise 
about half of our sample.  To separate the “concept effect” from the glamour effect, we use control firms 
matched by size and book to market.  To the extent that these matched firms have similar characteristics as 
glamour stocks, they provide a natural control.  In addition we control for glamour effects directly in our 
multivariate analyses.  Our results for concept stocks are robust to these controls for glamour effects. 
                                                     
10 Our operational definition of concept stocks requires an objective selection criterion.  We choose the sales to market 
ratio, noting the high correlation between the subjectively identified concept stocks (Appendix A) and our sample.  To 
the extent that we misclassify firms as concept stocks, we bias against finding significant results.  There is one exception 
to this statement: since our classification procedure is based on the sales to market ratio our results could really be 
describing the behavior of these firms.  A complete analysis of this issue would require an examination of all deciles of 
sales to market ratios, not just the highest.  Nevertheless, as shown in Table 10, we do not find a significant difference in 
the performance of our sample of concept stocks ranked by treciles according to the level of their sales to market ratio. 
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A related concern is whether our concept firms are likely to be small firms.  If this is the case, then we 
are picking up the (small-) size effect.  Figure 4b shows the fraction of concept stocks in each size decile.  The 
percentage in the smallest size decile ranges from 0.71% to 11% with an average of 6%.  Interestingly, 
concept stocks fall into each size decile quite evenly.  Thus, concept stocks do not necessary represent small 
firms.  We further examine the percentage of concept stocks in two-dimensional portfolios formed by both 
size and the book-to-market ratio.  The result (not reported) shows that the fraction of concept stocks in the 
smallest size/book-to-market portfolio is only 2%.  Thus, our sample of concept stocks does not show strong 
overlap with those identified as small-growth stocks.11  Nevertheless, we will continue to control for this in 
our multivariate analyses. 
2.3 Defining the control sample 
For the first part of our analysis we use a set of control firms matched on size and the book to market 
ratio.  This matching-firm technique is suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996) and implemented in numerous 
studies such as Loughran and Ritter (1997), Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000), Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli 
(2000) and Eckbo and Norli (2001).  Specifically, we select control firms using the following procedure: for 
each concept stock, select all firms with equity market values within 30% of the concept stock.  If the initial 
subset contains fewer than five candidate firms, we expand the range of equity market value to be within 40% 
of the concept stock.  We also delete potential control firms that are themselves concept stocks in the previous 
two years to increase independence in statistical tests and also to avoid the benchmark bias discussed in 
Loughran and Ritter (2000).  The firm with the closest book-to-market ratio among the remaining firms is 
chosen as its control firm.  Since the matching characteristics utilized to identify control firms (initially, size 
and market to book) are of interest themselves; it is also useful to have an alternate benchmark.  
Consequently, we also show results for the set of all CRSP/Compustat firms with stock price exceeding $5 
(which includes concept stocks).    Except where specified, differences between concept and control firms 
also hold between concept and all firms. In subsequent sections we also perform extensive sensitivity tests 
                                                     
11 To ensure that our results are not driven by the size or BV/MV effects, we later perform a robustness check on this 
issue. 
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examining alternate control groups by using other firm characteristics such as industry, cash flows and firm 
age. 
2.4 The time series of market to sales ratios 
 Panel A of Table 1 reveals the market to sales ratio for concept stocks, control firms and all firms 
over the 33 years of our sample.  As noted by the sample size in the far right column, approximately 1300 to 
3500 firms per year comprise the intersection of CRSP and Compustat firms from which concept and control 
firms are selected.  In general, the total number of firms increases over time.  Particularly notable is the 
dramatic increase between 1981 and 1982.  This is because of the addition of newly-listed Nasdaq firms to the 
CRSP database.  Fama and French (2001) also document this increase.  Further, since CRSP did not include 
Nasdaq firms until late 1972, we are careful to separate the early pre-NASDAQ period (1967 - 1972). 
 Figure 1a displays the time-series pattern of market-to-sales ratio for concept stocks relative to the 
ratio for all firms from the CRSP/Compustat intersection.  Several observations are apparent from Table 1 and 
graphs.  First, the difference between mean and median values of concept stocks and control firms has 
increased dramatically over the years.  The average concept stock sold for approximately three times sales in 
the late 60s and 70s, five times sales in the 80s and nearly 17 times sales in the 90s.  The data reveal two 
distinct plateaus of differences.  The market-to-sales ratio for concept stocks is substantially higher during the 
1980’s than during the previous decades.  The ratio has experienced even higher, albeit erratic levels during 
the 1990’s, rising to a high of 45.2 in 1999.  These trends are apparent in both the means and medians.  In 
comparison, Figure 1b displays the relatively stable ratio of market-to-book for concept stocks and all firms 
over the sample period.  Thus, compared to the CRSP universe, concept stocks have increasing market-to-
sales ratios over our sample period, but their market-to-book ratio remains stable.   
 We note that the dramatic shift in the ratio after 1981 is not driven by: (a) a dramatic increase in the 
level of the stock market or (b) a dramatic shift in the exchange listing composition of concept stocks.  This 
result is consistent with the findings of Fama and French (2001) who report a dramatic decline after 1978 in 
the percentage of firms paying dividends.  They attribute this result to “an increasing tilt of publicly traded 
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firms toward … low earnings, strong investments, and small size.”  With the exception of size (in market 
value) these are characteristics of concept stocks. 
 In the remainder of the paper, we condense our sample into six to nine year sub-periods for ease of 
exposition.12  Subperiods are organized to recognize the first years without Nasdaq (1967-72), the second 
period prior to the dramatic shift in the market to sales ratios (1973-81) and three remaining and equal 
subperiods.  Panel B of Table 1 displays the means and medians of the market to sales ratios for these sub-
periods.  
3. Characteristics of concept stocks 
3.1 Size, age and financial characteristics 
 Table 2 reveals the size, age, and financial characteristics of concept and control stocks over the sub-
periods of our sample.  Note that while we report both means and medians, we view the latter as more 
informative; mean values are more likely to be distorted by extreme values.  In addition, we note that the set 
of all firms also includes all concept stocks and is thus biased toward acceptance of the null hypothesis of no 
difference between concept and control stocks.  Nevertheless, all of the variables analyzed show significant 
differences for concept stocks either at the mean or median.13  For most variables, both mean and median are 
significantly different. 
Panel A of Table 2 indicates that concept firms are significantly larger in market value than the 
associated control firms.  However, this result is driven by the sample characteristics before 1981.  In this 
period, concept stocks are significantly larger than average CRSP firms.  Analysis of book value, however, 
reveals that mean and median book values are significantly smaller for concept stocks in all of the sub-periods 
analyzed.  Since book to market ratios are used in the identification of the control sample, this explains why 
the book to market ratios for control firms are lower than that for the sample of all firms.  Nevertheless, we 
find that the book to market ratio of concept stocks is significantly lower than that of control firms and the 
                                                     
12 Results on a yearly basis are available upon request. 
13 In our measure of statistical significance, White (1980) corrected t-statistics are used throughout the paper to take into 
account the possibility of correlation among observations. 
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entire sample.  Moreover, while even the median book to market ratios exhibit considerable variation over the 
five sub-periods, the values for concept stocks are always lower.     
Panel B.1 reveals the age distribution of concept stocks.  Approximately 18% of the concept stocks 
are IPOs, defined here as any firm listed less than a year on the CRSP tapes.  Nearly 61% of concept stocks 
have been listed five years or less.  More than 20% of our concept stocks, however, have been listed longer 
than ten years; the oldest concept stock has been listed over 69 years!  Panel B.2 reveals the average age 
across the subperiods for concept and control stocks.  The age of concept stocks in terms of years listed on 
CRSP reveals that they are typically four to seven years younger than control firms.  It is also evident that the 
mean and median ages of concept stocks are higher in the first two subperiods of our sample; the average age 
of concept stocks is decreasing over time.  This is consistent with the influx of new listings mentioned in 
Fama and French (2001).  Panel B.3 shows the percentage of concept stocks that are IPOs in each subperiod. 
Over the entire sample period, 17.62% of our concept stocks are IPOs.  For the subperiods, the average 
percentage of concept stocks that are IPOs ranges from 1.6% to 27.35%.  Thus, while the ages of concept 
stocks are generally young, less than 20% are IPOs.  The annual pattern (not reported) shows that, before 
1990, the percentage of IPO concept stocks is higher than 20% in only two out of twenty-four years. 
However, after 1990, the percentage has increased to higher than 20% in almost every year.  It ranges from 
16% (in 1998) to 37% (in 1999) with an average of 27% during the post-1990 period.  In our analysis of 
abnormal performance, we will be careful to control for any IPO effect. 
We note in Panel C that concept stocks tend to have less leverage relative to their control firms in all 
sample periods.14  On the other hand, concept stocks have significantly higher levels of research and 
development, advertising, and capital expenditures (all expressed as a ratio to sales).  In the mid to late 
nineties, the median level of R&D spending approaches 34% of sales.   
In summary, the typical concept stock is smaller in terms of book value, younger, less levered, more 
research oriented, and spending proportionately more on advertising and capital expenditures than control 
                                                     
14 The leverage ratio is defined as debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt normalized by firm market value. 
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firms.  Testing whether these increased R&D and capital expenditures pay off over time will be inherent in 
our analysis of the long run performance of concept stocks. 
3.2 Concept Stocks, Profitability and Positive Cash Flows 
 Panel D of Table 2 reveals a shift over time in three profitability variables: operating margin, returns 
on assets, and net profit margin.15  Each of these variables experience declines in both absolute value and 
relative to the control firms except for the second subperiod.  Thus, there is either an increasing tendency for 
the market to select unprofitable firms as concept stocks or an increasing proportion of CRSP firms that report 
negative earnings.  
 The percentage of concept stocks with positive earnings and cash flows, displayed in Panel E, has 
also declined markedly over the sample period both in absolute terms and relative to the control firms.  While 
more than 95% of the concept stocks have positive earnings in the early 1970s, this number experienced a 
dramatic decline in the early 1980s and again in the 1990s.  Interestingly, this corresponds with the dramatic 
increases in market to sales ratios previously noted.  Our results are again consistent with Fama and French 
(2001) who also cite a dramatic increase in CRSP firms after 1978 and a sharp decline in profitability after 
1982. The dramatic differences in financial ratios and other firm characteristics raise the question of the 
identity of the concept stocks.  Do certain industries dominate concept stocks?  Has the industrial composition 
changed over time?  In how many years do individual stocks appear as concept stocks?  The next several 
sections address these questions. 
3.3 Trading Characteristics of Concept Stocks 
 Panel A of Table 3 reports the frequency with which individual concept stocks appear across the 33 
years of our sample.  The vast majority (65.4%) of our firms appear just once or twice as concept stocks.  
                                                     
15 Operating margin is defined as Operating income before depreciation (Compustat #13) divided by Sales (#12). Return 
on assets is Operating income before depreciation (#13)/Assets (#6). Net Profit margin is Net income (#172)/Sales (#12). 
Similar results, not shown here are obtained using Return on equity.  ROE is Operating income before depreciation 
(#13)/(Total assets – Total liabilities (#6 - #181)). 
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1,095 firms appear just once as concept stocks; 529 firms appear twice.  A very small percentage of firms 
(3.6%) appear more than ten times.16  
 Panel B displays a transition matrix for market to sales ratios, the metric used to identify concept 
stocks.  The body of the table reveals the probability that stocks in a particular decile in year t-1 have moved 
to a particular decile in year t.  For example, 76% of the firms in decile ten remain in decile ten in the next 
period.  Approximately 69% of our concept stocks (decile 10) remain concept stocks in the next year.  We 
also calculate the average transition probability for concept stocks in each of our subperiods and across 
exchanges.  In results not shown, we find that while NASDAQ stocks are more likely to become concept 
stocks, the stability of concept stocks is higher among NYSE/AMEX firms.  Approximately 72% of 
NYSE/AMEX concept stocks remain concept stocks in the next period compared to 66% for NASDAQ firms.   
3.4 Exchanges and Trading Volume 
 Panel C of Table 3 reveals the distribution of concept stocks across the NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ.  The composition of our concept stock portfolio has shifted substantially with regard to the 
exchanges.  NASDAQ firms comprise approximately 1.29% of our concept stocks in the 1973-81 period but 
over 85% of our concept stocks in the 1994-99 period.  Of course, while these percentages relate to the 
composition of our concept stock sample, the total number of firms listed on each of the exchanges differs, 
both cross-sectionally and across time.  Consequently, we also report the percentage of firms listed on a given 
exchange that are concept stocks.  In the early 1970s, for example, around 10% of NYSE firms are concept 
stocks.  By the end of our sample approximately 2% are concept stocks.  Interestingly, the proportion of 
NASDAQ stocks that are also concept stocks has remained relatively stable over the past 10-15 years.  
The final columns of Panel C reveal the turnover of concept stocks relative to control firms. 
Turnover, defined as the annual average of monthly trading volume divided by shares outstanding, averages 
9.8 % for concept stocks over the entire period.  This is significantly greater than 7.0 % for the control firms 
                                                     
16 Four firms appear 23, 24 (2 firms) and 26 times in our sample. These firms are Merck (Ticker symbol: MRK), Syntex 
(SYN), Homestake Mining (HM), and Callahan Mining (CMN), respectively.  As the name suggests, Callahan and 
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and 6.3% for the entire sample.  It is also apparent that while trading volume has increased for all firms over 
the sample period it has increased more dramatically for concept stocks. 
3.5 The Industry Composition of Concept Stocks 
 A summary of the industry distribution of concept stocks based on CRSP SIC codes is presented in 
Table 4.  At the 2-digit SIC level there are 99 potential industries each year.  In Table 4, we select the five 
industries with the highest number of concept stocks and display them across each year ranked from highest 
(1) to fifth highest (5).17  In the case of ties, we do not skip the next rank(s). Thus, it is possible that we report 
more than five industries.  For example, there are two industries ranked third and three industries ranked fifth 
in 1969.  
 The data reveal interesting shifts in the composition of concept stocks.  Throughout the decade of the 
60s and 70s “oil and gas extraction” frequently appear among the concept stocks.  “Metal mining stocks” 
were slightly less popular, with slightly lower rank, over a similar period.  However, “oil and gas extraction” 
does not appear in the 91-99 period and “metal mining” does not appear after 1989.  On the other hand, 
“business computer related services” does not appear prior to 1981 except 1969 and 1978; not coincidentally, 
this is around the time of the initial personal computers.  This industry is among the top five in terms of 
concept stocks in each of the remaining years of the sample.  “Engineering, management and research” also 
enters the sample for the first time in the decade of the 1990s and then appears in five of the eight subsequent 
years.  Finally, four industries appear in almost all of the years of our sample.  These are “chemicals and 
allied products”, “industrial, computer, office equipment”, “electronic and electrical equipment” and 
“instruments and related products”.  For completeness, we also identify with an asterisk, any top 5 concept 
industry that is also a top 5 industry in terms of the number of IPOs in a particular year.  High industry 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Homestake are mining companies.  Callahan mines silver while Homestake concentrates on Gold.  Merck and Syntex are 
typically described as research oriented pharmaceutical companies. 
17 We use CRSP SIC codes.  Kahle and Walkling (1996) show that CRSP and Compustat SIC codes differ by 
approximately 40% at the 2-digit level and 80% at the 4-digit level.  While this research indicates that the specification 
and power of Compustat SIC classifications outperforms that of CRSP, it also notes that only the latter reveals historic 
SICs. 
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valuations present a fertile time for IPOs.  As we have seen from Table 2, this does not necessarily mean that 
the concept stocks are themselves IPOs; less than 20% of concept stocks are IPOs.   
Are the shifts in the composition of concept stocks statistically significant?  We calculate the Pearson 
Chi-square measure that tests the null hypothesis of no variation in the composition of concept stocks across 
industries over time.  The statistic is defined as Σi(fi – ei)2/ei, where fi is the actual number of concept stocks in 
industry i and ei is the expected number of concept stocks in industry i.  Since some industries have few 
companies during our sample period, we only include industries with at least 10 firms to perform the test.18 
The Pearson Chi-square statistic is 3,727 with degrees of freedom equal to 44 (number of industries minus 
one).  The associated p-value, (<0.001), indicates that concept stocks are concentrated in some industries. 
3.6 The Longevity of Concept Stocks 
 In this section we begin our analysis of the investment characteristics of concept stocks.  We first 
address the survival of concept stocks over time by calculating the percentage of concept and control stocks 
delisted within ten years after selection.  We then compute the mean/median differences in percentage of 
firms delisted after n years (n = 1 to 10) between concept stocks and control firms and examine significance 
tests for the hypothesis of no difference.  
 The results (not shown in a table) indicate that the longevity of concept stocks has declined since the 
late 1970s.  Two-thirds of the concept stocks from 1972 were still trading 10 years later; the corresponding 
figure for the concept stocks of the decade beginning with 1978 is around 60%.  As before, this corresponds 
to the period where negative profitability becomes dominant among concept stocks.  Corresponding figures 
for control firms also show a similar decline in longevity.  The percentage of control firms still listed ten years 
after selection declines throughout our sample period but is generally higher than that of concept stocks.  
 CRSP lists four primary reasons for the delisting of firms: acquired by merger; acquired by exchange 
of stock; liquidated; and dropped by NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ.  We find that 2249 concept stocks are de-
listed over the sample period in comparison to 1920 control firms.  For both concept stocks and control firms, 
                                                     
18 When we change the requirement of ten firms to five firms, our result is not affected. 
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the major delisting reason is due to merger, 67.3% for concept stocks and 75.8% for control firms.  The 
second reason for de-listing is that they were dropped from NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ.  This occurs for 
26.7% of the concept stocks in comparison to 18.9% of the control firms.  Importantly, these are not 
bankruptcy cases; those are covered under liquidation.  The “dropped” cases occur because the firms move to 
another exchange or because they fail to meet exchange requirements (an insufficient number of market 
makers, etc).  Although differences do exist in particular years, there is no evidence that concept stocks are 
more likely to be de-listed over the entire sample period.  
4. The Relative Performance of Concept Stocks 
4.1 Accounting Performance  
 It is argued that the fundamentals of concept stock preclude transparent valuation.  We begin our 
analysis of the relative performance of concept stocks by examining accounting performance.  Table 5 reveals 
changes in key accounting ratios of both concept stocks and control firms from the period 2 years before the 
selection of the firm as a concept or control stock to 2 years after the selection.  We test for significant 
differences in the means of the variables using a two-sided robust t-test.  Differences in medians are analyzed 
with the Wilcoxon signed rank test.19   
Panel A reveals data on long-term debt, research and development, advertising, and capital 
expenditures.  Concept stocks have significantly smaller amounts of long-term debt than control firms in each 
of the five years analyzed.  However, levels of R&D and capital expenditures and the median levels of 
advertising to sales are significantly greater for concept stocks than for control stocks for each year analyzed.  
This is consistent with the popular notion that these firms have unusual potential for future returns.   
 Panel B reveals several profitability measures in the 5 years surrounding year zero.  Values are 
reported for the operating margin, returns on assets, profit margin, and operating returns on equity.  With a 
few exceptions, concept firms are generally less profitable than their control firm counterparts.  We do not 
observe a definitive trend towards more or less profitability over time.  
                                                     
19 To ensure comparability, when either the concept firm or the control firm is delisted, we exclude its counterpart in the 
sample. 
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4.2 Logistic Analysis of Concept Stocks vs. Control Stocks 
 Table 6 presents a logistic analysis of the factors related to concept stocks.  In particular, we ask: 
“What variables distinguish concept stocks from the stocks of other companies?” and “Do these variables 
change over time?”  We report the results from annual logistic regressions.  In the spirit of Fama and 
MacBeth (1973), we first run the regressions year by year and then use the time-series coefficients and 
standard deviations from these time series to calculate the significance of the estimates.  The advantage of this 
procedure is to control for correlation of the regression residuals across firms.  The dependent variable is set 
equal to one for concept stocks and zero for either all other firms or control firms.  Separate regressions 
include industry dummies and year dummies.   
 Our results indicate that for the overall sample period, the probability of being a concept stock is 
negatively related to leverage, profitability and age.  The results are statistically and economically significant.  
For instance, model 1 indicates that a one percent increase in debt ratio is associated with 2.5 percent drop in 
probability that the firm will be selected as a concept stock.  Surprisingly, after controlling for other factors, 
the probability of being a concept stock is insignificantly related to being listed on NASDAQ.  This result, for 
the entire 33-year period, is consistent with the shifting patterns of exchange identity of concept stocks noted 
earlier in the paper.  The probability of being a concept stock is significantly positively related to research and 
development expenditures and capital expenditures while it is negatively related to the book to market ratio.  
Thus, concept firms are smaller, less levered and less profitable, but are spending significantly more on R&D 
and capital expenditures.  As proxied by the book to market ratio, they have higher growth opportunities.  
Proponents of concept stocks typically argue that these higher expenditures and greater growth opportunities 
will translate into higher subsequent returns.  We turn to this issue in the next section. 
4.3 Long-run market returns 
 It is important to note that our analysis is not an event study.  Our firms do enter the sample in a 
particular year, however and to test our hypothesis we need to study the subsequent (long term or short term) 
performance of concept stocks.  The current literature is divided on the best methodology for identifying long 
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run abnormal returns.  Loughran and Ritter (2000) and Barber and Lyon (1997) argue for the use of buy and 
hold returns.  Fama and French (1993, 1998), Mitchell and Stafford (1999), and Brav, Geczy, and Gompers 
(2000) argue for the use of the Fama-French three-factor model.  Rather than choosing one approach in our 
tests of the long-term performance of concept stocks, we use both.  Notice, however, that studies using the 
Fama-French three-factor model are less likely to find abnormal returns.   
4.3.1 Calendar Time Portfolio Regressions 
 In Table 7 we analyze calendar time portfolio regressions using the portfolio return of concept stocks, 
control stocks, or a zero investment portfolio as indicated. Zero investment portfolios are formed by creating a 
long position in the concept stocks and a short position in matching firms.  Each month we form equal and 
value weighted portfolios containing all concept stocks chosen in the previous year. The value-weighted 
portfolios are re-balanced monthly.  Matching firms are drawn from a population of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ 
stocks using the combined size and book to market matching procedure.  We analyze five sets of regressions.  
The first and second sets of regressions use the market return and the Fama-French (1993) factors, 
respectively, as independent variables.20  The third set of regressions add the Carhart (1997) momentum 
factor, constructed as the return difference of all CRSP firms in the highest and lowest return treciles over the 
previous 11 months.21  The fourth set of regressions adds turnover for both concept stocks and matched stocks 
as appropriate.  The final set of regressions adds dummy variables for returns in January, December and in 
“hot” periods.  A “hot” period is a dummy variable set equal to one in expansion months and zero in 
contraction months as designated by the NBER.22
    
                                                     
20 We thank Ken French for providing us with the return series on these three factors. 
21 In ranking previous-year returns, we skip the last month in the portfolio formation period to reduce the potential bias 
from bid-ask bounces and monthly return reversals. 
22 We note an important methodological issue raised by Loughran and Ritter (2000).  They argue that mixing firms with 
large and small capitalization will result in low power in detecting long-run abnormal returns.  The problem is 
particularly severe when a value-weighted index is used.  Our concept stocks exhibit very different size characteristics 
across time.  Consequently, the results presented below should be interpreted with this issue in mind.  For an alternate 
view on this issue, see Mitchell and Stafford (1999). 
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 Since we are interested in the performance of concept stocks relative to that of our control firms, we 
focus our interpretation on the zero investment portfolios.  As shown in Table 7, our control stocks typically 
have significantly positive intercepts in the Fama-French regressions.  This is the opposite of the typical result 
for glamour stocks.  In the portfolios of concept stocks and control firms, the significantly negative 
coefficients of the book-to-market variables indicate that both concept and control firms have lower book-to-
market ratios relative to the market.  The coefficients of SMB suggest that the control firms tend to be smaller 
than the average firms in the market. The concept firms also tend to be smaller in the equal-weighted 
portfolios but the coefficients are insignificant in the value-weighed portfolios.  
Most importantly, the intercept for the zero investment portfolio is significantly negative in all five 
sets of regressions.  Thus, the concept stocks under-perform their control firms regardless of the set of 
variables used to control for risk characteristics.   Similar results are noted for the value-weighted portfolios 
shown in panel B.    
 We further examine relative long-term performance on ten subsets of firms.  Panel C reports the 
coefficients of intercepts from zero-investment portfolios.  The subsets examine survivorship, exchange, time 
period, IPO, and SEO effects.  In our matching of concept to control firms, we are careful to employ the same 
criteria for each.  That is, concept firms that survive must be matched with control firms that survive; concept 
firms on NASDAQ must be matched with control firms from NASDAQ, etc.  The exceptions to this in panel 
C are that concept stocks that are IPOs or SEOs are matched against all control firms, not just IPO or SEO 
controls.  There are too few IPO or SEO firms for a meaningful match. 
When firms are de-listed, our procedure implicitly assumes sale of the stock at the last quoted price.  
It is not hard to imagine that in the event of extreme financial distress, this last quoted price might not be 
realizable.  On average, we would expect this problem (if it exists) to impart an upward bias in our measure of 
concept stock returns. This is because a higher proportion (26.7%) of concept stocks are dropped by NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ or liquidated in comparison to the figure for control firms (18.9%).  
Another way to analyze the impact of any de-listing bias is to examine the sub-sample of firms still 
trading.  Restricting our analysis to those firms that actually survived to the end of our sample eliminates any 
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significant underperformance.  Obviously, such foresight is impossible in practice.  Still, the results indicate 
that at least some of the underperformance of concept stocks is due to the firms that fail to survive. 
 A criterion that can be implemented ex ante is the selection of firms with positive earnings or firms 
on certain exchanges.  Our results indicate that firms with positive earnings and subsets of firms on various 
exchanges perform similarly to the control firms.  In addition, concept stocks significantly underperform in 
both the post-1981 and the 1967-80 periods.  We also note that underperformance is not an IPO effect; it 
exists for both IPO and non-IPO firms.  Finally, we do not find evidence that SEO concept stocks have 
different performance than our control sample. 
4.3.2 Buy and hold returns 
An alternate procedure to analyze long-term performance is to use buy and hold returns [Loughran 
and Ritter (2000) and Barber and Lyon (1997).]  Table 8 presents a yearly analysis of the 5-year buy and hold 
abnormal returns of concept stocks and their matching firms.  Figure 2 presents a corresponding graph 
revealing monthly results over the five year period.   In our analysis of 5 year buy and hold abnormal returns 
we first use the original matching procedure of size and market to book ratio.  Since, many measures of 
performance are mean reverting, Barber and Lyon (1995) note the importance of controlling for pre-event 
performance in choosing matching firms.  Failure to control for this produces mis-specified results.  As a 
consequence, we also test for differences with four other sets of control firms.  Two sets of control firms are 
derived by first matching by size and then by earnings and cash flows, respectively.  A fourth control sample 
matches by firms in the same three-digit CRSP SIC code and then by size.  A fifth set of control firms are 
matched by firm age and then by market to book ratio.  As before, we require that control firms not have been 
concept stocks in the previous two years.  If concept stock is delisted, we substitute the control firm’s return 
in the concept return series and vice versa until both firms are delisted.  In this case, both firms drop out of 
the portfolio.  
Results for the entire sample are presented in Panel A.  Because of the need to match firms and the 
availability of data, sample sizes vary slightly depending on the criteria chosen.  However, regardless of the 
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matching criteria used to form a control sample, we find that the short and long run performance of concept 
stocks is negative relative to that of the control samples.  It is immediately apparent from Figure 2 that the 
long run performance of concept stocks is inferior to that of our initial control sample or any other control 
sample applied.  The only exception is the restriction of the concept stocks to NYSE and AMEX firms and 
years before 1981.  These firms perform about the same as their control sample over the entire five-year 
period. 
When we restrict our analysis to firms still active at the end of our sample, the negative performance 
is not significant.23  A separate analysis is conducted on firms with non-negative earnings.  To insure an 
appropriate comparison, both concept and control firms need to have non-negative earnings.  The objective 
here is to analyze whether different returns could be earned by focusing on firms that were already 
experiencing positive earnings.  The level of underperformance is dramatically less, being significant over 
only a portion of the five years following selection as a concept stock. 
To examine the impact of exchange listings, we run separate comparisons for NYSE/AMEX and 
Nasdaq firms.  Listed concept stocks actually outperform the control sample throughout the entire sample 
period.  Results are insignificant, however.  In contrast, Nasdaq firms have significant underperformance 
throughout. 
In the next two analyses of Panel B we examine performance before and after 1981.  Concept stocks 
significantly under-perform in the post-1981 period.  This is similar to the results noted in the preceding 
paragraph and is a probably related to the increased number of NASDAQ firms found in the post-1981 period.   
Finally, we examine the buy and hold performance of firms with equity issuances (IPOs or SEOs).  
Both IPO and non-IPO firms tend to under-perform relative to their control samples.  However, the level of 
underperformance is generally insignificant in the IPO firms.  Thus, the level of underperformance noted for 
concept stocks is not driven by the IPO phenomenon.  We further broaden the definition of IPO concept 
stocks to include firms with ages of two years or younger.  The results still hold.  The differences of buy-and-
                                                     
23 Further investigation shows that in fact, concept stocks significantly under-perform relative to control firms in 36 out 
of 60 months. The underperformance is more severe in years three and beyond. 
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hold returns between the (non-IPO) concept stocks and the control firms are –1.31%, -6.33%, -11.04%, -
17.61%, and –13.76% for years 1 to 5, respectively.  The first year’s difference is insignificant.  The 
remaining differences are significant beyond the .001 level.  In contrast to the results in Table 7, the results in 
subsamples (IX) and (X) indicate concept stocks with equity issuances actually perform better than their 
match sample.  Concept firms without equity issuances under-perform from 10% to 22% in the long run.  
4.3.3 Have we only captured glamour or contrarian effect? 
 It is well documented that glamour stocks earn lower subsequent returns than value stocks (see, e.g., 
LaPorta, et. al. (1997)).  In addition, stocks that perform well in the past three to five years also earn lower 
subsequent returns (see, e.g., DeBondt and Thaler (1985)).  Since concept stocks in general perform better 
than other firms in prior years, it could be argued that the “concept stock” effect that we have documented is 
simply driven by the glamour or the contrarian effect. 
 To examine this possibility more closely, we independently sort the set of concept stocks into treciles 
each year by (1) the book-to-market ratio and (2) past 3-year returns.  The buy-and-hold returns are then 
calculated in each trecile.  Panel A of Table 9 presents the results using the book-to-market ratio.  Rank 1 
includes concept stocks with the lowest book-to-market ratio in the previous year while rank 3 includes the 
ones with the highest ratio.  Examining returns of both concept and control stocks across the three treciles 
confirm the glamour vs. value effect.  Subsequent yearly returns are consistently higher as we move from the 
lowest book to market (glamour stocks) to the highest book to market (value stocks).  The difference in 
returns between concept stocks and control firms, however, is consistently negative suggesting that there is 
clearly a concept stock effect that is independent of the glamour effect.  Although this result is weaker for 
rank 3, overall, concept stocks have lower returns than control firms in all three ranks.  This difference is 
more evident in Figure 3 that plots the buy-and-hold abnormal returns in the subsequent five years after 
selection.  It suggests that concept stocks under-perform even after we control for the glamour effect.   
 To test for contrarian effects, we repeat this exercise by replacing the book-to-market ratio with the 
past 3-year returns as the ranking criteria.  Panel B and the corresponding plot in Figure 3 indicate that the 
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underperformance of control stocks is independent of the contrarian effect.  Results of underperformance in 
concept stocks do not appear to be driven by the glamour or the contrarian effect. 
4.4 Determinants of success of concept stocks 
 Although we have documented that on average, buying concept stocks is not profitable in the long 
run, some concept firms did seem to turn their ideas into reality.  Put more precisely, the cross section of five-
year buy and hold returns to concept stocks exhibits considerable cross sectional variation.  In this section, we 
examine via multivariate regression, whether the firm specific variables identified in this research are useful 
in explaining this cross sectional variation.  Applying the Fama-MacBeth procedure, we run the regressions 
year by year and then use the time-series coefficients to calculate the significance of the estimates.  
 Results, presented in Table 10, indicate that smaller and Nasdaq firms are more likely to have lower 
returns once they are chosen as concept stocks.24  This is consistent with the notion that smaller firms have 
higher information asymmetry and thus may experience more severe investor misvaluation.  The results also 
show that among concept stocks, those with higher R&D expenditures perform better than those with lower 
R&D expenses.  This link between R&D and subsequent returns is consistent with the research of Lev and 
Sougiannis (1996).  We also find that concept stocks with equity issuances earn higher returns in the long run.  
This is consistent with the result in Table 8.  We do not find any difference in performance among (market to 
sales) treciles of concept stocks themselves.  Finally, the significantly positive coefficients of profitability-
related variables indicate that profitable concept stocks are associated with higher future returns.   
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 The recent financial literature contains several interesting empirical analyses of selected categories of 
stocks and selected investment strategies.  A heretofore-unaddressed category of stocks, commonly appearing 
in the financial press over the past three decades is “concept stocks”, typically identified as stocks with 
extremely high market to sales ratios.  Using the intersection of the CRSP/Compustat universe, we define 
concept firms as those ranked between the 91st and 100th percentile of the market to sales ratio for each of the 
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thirty-three years of our sample.  Empirically, the identity of concept stocks is quite distinct from glamour 
stocks, IPOs, SEOs, or stocks identified by contrarian strategies.  
Critics argue that concept stocks are grossly overvalued.  Proponents argue that their characteristics 
and prospects elude traditional pricing models.  Instead, it is argued that you have to buy the “concept” to 
appreciate these firms.  The concept typically involves some explanation of why future earnings are 
promising for these firms.  The debate over concept stocks is, thus, an empirical question that can only be 
resolved through an analysis of their characteristics and subsequent performance.  
Our examination of these issues documents several key results:  First, the industrial and financial 
characteristics of concept stocks have changed dramatically over time.  While the obvious recent examples of 
concept stocks are internet and biotech stocks, the composition of concept stocks has shifted dramatically 
over the last three decades.  The industries containing the most popular concept stocks evolve from oil and 
gas extraction in the 60s and 70s, to computer and office equipment in the 80s, and to computer-related 
services in the 90s.  Second, the average relative valuation of the typical concept stock has risen dramatically 
over the thirty-three years of our analysis while the book-to-market ratio of concept stocks does not exhibit 
systematic changes.  At the same time, the percentage of concept stocks with positive earnings has sharply 
declined; more than 95% have positive earnings near the beginning of our sample, less than 40% have 
positive earnings near the end.  Consistent with street wisdom, concept stocks have higher levels of research 
and development and greater capital expenditures than comparison firms.  Nevertheless, the long run 
performance of concept stocks is negative relative to control firms.  This result holds for both Fama-French 
(1993) three-factor models and the buy-and-hold approach and is robust to extensive sensitivity analyses.  
Finally, after controlling for glamour, contrarian, and new equity effects, the under-performance of concept 
stocks remains significant.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
24 Nasdaq stocks have insignificantly negative returns if we fail to control for industry effects. 
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Figure 1. The Relative Ratios of Concept Stocks to All Firm, 1967 ~ 1999. 
 
Plots of the market-to-sales and market-to-book ratios for concept stocks relative to all firms reported in both Compustat and CRSP. 
Concept stocks are defined as the firms in the 1st to 10th percentile of sales-to-market ratio each year. The equity market value is the 
market capitalization of common stock at calendar year-end. Book values and market values not used in ratios are deflated using the 
CPI into 1998 dollars.  
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Figure 1b. MV/BV of Concept Stocks Relative to the Whole 
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Figure 2. Five-year Buy-and-hold Abnormal Returns 
 
Plot of difference in buy-and-hold returns between concept stocks and control firms. The control firms are chosen using various two-way matching 
procedures based on firm characteristics. In all procedures, available benchmarks are CRSP firms, and are not concept stocks in the previous two 
years. The first three subsets of matching candidates are firms that have market values within 30% of the market value of the concept stock. In the 
first (second, third) procedure, the firm with the closest book-to-market ratio (earnings, cash flows) is chosen as the control firm. If the subset 
contains fewer than five candidate firms, we expand the range of market value to be within 40%. The fourth subset of matching candidates are 
firms with the same 3-digit industry code as the concept stock. If the subset contains less than five firms, we include firms with the same 2-digit 
industry code. The firm with the closest equity market value to that of the concept stock is chosen as the control firm. The fifth procedure matches 
each concept stocks with the firm that has the same age and the closest book-to-market ratio. The other eight procedures constrain the sample 
based on other characteristics such as delisting, exchanges, time periods, and IPOs. 
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Figure 3. Five-year Buy-and-hold Abnormal Returns Based on The Book-to-market Ratio and 
Past 3-year Returns  
 
Plot of difference in buy-and-hold returns between concept stocks and control firms.  
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Figure 4. Percentage of Concept Stocks in Each of the Book-to-market or Size Deciles. 
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Figure 4b. 
Percentage of concept stocks in each size decile
[1: smallest, 10:largest]
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Table 1.  The Market-to-Sales Ratio of the Sample Over Time, 1967 ~ 99 
 
We report time-series trends of the ratio of equity market value to sales (MV/Sales) for our sample, concept stocks and control firms. 
The sample universe consists of all non-financial firms in the intersection of CRSP monthly return files and the merged 
COMPUSTAT annual industrial files from 1965 to 1999. Firms with stock prices less than five dollars are deleted. Concept stocks are 
defined as the firms in the 91st to 100th percentile of market-to-sales ratio each year. The equity market value is the market 
capitalization of common stock at calendar year-end. Book values and market values not used in ratios are deflated using the CPI into 
1998 dollars. N is the number of non-missing firms in CRSP each year. Control firms are chosen using a two-way matching procedure 
involving size and the book-to-market ratio. First, we identify the subset of matching candidates that have market values within 30% 
of a concept stock and are not concept stocks themselves in the previous two years. From this subset, the firm with the closest book-
to-market ratio is chosen as the control firm. If the subset contains fewer than five candidate firms, we expand the range of market 
value to be within 40%. "Diff" under Control Firms calculates the average/median difference of mean/median between concept stocks 
and control firms each year, and "Diff" under All Firms calculates the average/median difference of mean/median between concept 
stocks and all firms in the sample. p-values under Mean are associated with robust t-statistic using a two-sided t-test of no difference 
in the mean each year. p-values under Median are associated with Wilcoxon signed rank test of no difference in median each year. 
 
Panel A: Distribution by year  
                      
 Concept Stocks  Control Firms  All Firms   
Year Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  N 
1967 5.447 5.498  1.218 1.607  0.606 0.915  1324 
1968 5.889 5.701  1.336 1.664  0.762 1.054  1483 
1969 4.221 4.063  0.979 1.234  0.445 0.655  1574 
1970 3.222 3.013  0.780 1.130  0.363 0.552  1553 
1971 3.864 3.672  0.811 1.237  0.410 0.634  1619 
1972 3.976 4.019  0.985 1.436  0.361 0.575  1688 
1973 2.993 3.200  0.687 0.985  0.197 0.298  1464 
1974 1.622 1.588  0.332 0.579  0.139 0.198  1236 
1975 1.925 1.917  0.377 0.620  0.210 0.304  1282 
1976 1.952 1.970  0.388 0.643  0.245 0.358  1445 
1977 1.713 1.677  0.411 0.554  0.240 0.358  1425 
1978 1.717 1.618  0.414 0.533  0.223 0.318  1437 
1979 2.162 2.087  0.580 0.675  0.237 0.353  1379 
1980 2.990 3.067  0.562 1.051  0.266 0.401  1365 
1981 2.350 2.229  0.534 0.889  0.253 0.383  1403 
1982 4.995 5.192  0.445 0.774  0.349 0.562  2220 
1983 7.092 7.168  0.512 0.850  0.462 0.759  2668 
1984 4.382 4.125  0.561 0.888  0.391 0.605  2504 
1985 5.089 4.883  0.812 1.385  0.477 0.736  2367 
1986 6.165 5.672  0.823 1.265  0.501 0.757  2438 
1987 5.402 5.003  0.599 0.911  0.385 0.634  2439 
1988 4.780 4.386  0.518 0.820  0.439 0.660  2083 
1989 5.583 5.084  0.896 1.230  0.443 0.722  2000 
1990 5.107 4.671  0.896 1.218  0.343 0.595  1843 
1991 12.690 13.477  0.922 1.574  0.495 0.906  2036 
1992 13.514 15.221  0.933 1.282  0.570 1.008  2340 
1993 15.723 15.723  0.988 1.533  0.656 1.078  2725 
1994 9.690 8.945  0.936 1.555  0.581 0.976  2878 
1995 14.514 13.966  1.194 2.128  0.588 1.139  3067 
1996 21.142 21.368  1.191 1.868  0.679 1.320  3526 
1997 16.611 16.313  1.117 1.564  0.725 1.336  3520 
1998 14.903 14.993  1.409 2.256  0.578 1.046  3170 
1999 45.249 48.077  1.365 4.346  0.546 1.290  2942 
1967-99 7.839 4.883  0.803 1.230  0.429 0.655  68443 
Diff    7.035 3.653  7.409 4.227   
(p-value)    (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.  – Continued – 
 
Panel B. Distribution by sub-period 
 
 Concept Stocks  Control Firms                          All Firms
Period   Mean Median      Mean Median      Mean Median   N 
1967-72  4.436 4.041    1.018 1.337    0.491 0.645  9241 
1973-81  2.158 1.970    0.476 0.643    0.223 0.353  12436 
1982-87  5.521 5.097    0.625 0.899    0.428 0.685  14636 
1988-93  9.566 9.280    0.859 1.256    0.491 0.814  13027 
1994-99   20.351 15.653       1.202 1.998       0.616 1.214   19103 
1967-99         7.839         4.883            0.803        1.230           0.429         0.655  68443 
Diff             7.035 3.653       7.409 4.227     
(p-value)             (0.000) (0.000)       (0.000) (0.000)     
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Characteristics of Concept Stocks, 1967 ~ 99 
Descriptive statistics on key variables for our sample over time. We report the results based on five subperiods. Firm market value, in log (millions), is natural logarithm of the 
summation of the market capitalization of common stock at calendar year-end, debt in liabilities, long-term debt, and preferred stock. Book value is total assets minus total 
liabilities and preferred stock. Firm book size, in log (000s), is the natural logarithm of book value. Age is defined as the difference between year of interest and the earliest year 
that the firm has traded stock price available in CRSP. The long-term debt ratio is debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt divided by firm market value. Operating margin is 
defined as operating income before depreciation divided by sales. Return on assets is defined as operating income before depreciation divided by assets. Profit margin is net 
income divided by sales. Net working capital ratio is total current assets minus current liabilities divided by assets. Cash flow is defined as operating income before depreciation. 
Book values and market values not used in ratios are deflated using the CPI into 1998 dollars. Control firms are chosen using a two-way matching procedure involving size and the 
book-to-market ratio. First, we identify the subset of matching candidates that have market values within 30% of a concept stock and are not concept stocks themselves in the 
previous two years. From this subset, the firm with the closest book-to-market ratio is chosen as the control firm. If the subset contains fewer than five candidate firms, we expand 
the range of market value to be within 40%. "Diff" under Control Firms calculates the average/median difference of mean/median between concept stocks and control firms each 
year, and "Diff" under All Firms calculates the average/median difference of mean/median between concept stocks and all firms in the sample. Panel B does not include the 
observations in 1972 when we calculate the age distribution of concept stocks due to the fact that CRSP started to include NASDAQ firms into the database in 1972. Therefore, 
firms with age zero in 1972 are not necessarily IPO firms. P-values under Mean are associated with robust t-statistic using a two-sided t-test of no difference in the mean each year. 
P-values under Median are associated with Wilcoxon signed rank test of no difference in median each year. 
 
Panel A: Size and Book-to-market ratio                   
 Market Value  Firm (Book) Size  Book-to-market Ratio
 Concept Control All Firms  Concept Control All Firms  Concept Control All Firms
Period Mean Med. Mean Median Mean Median Mean Medi. Mean Median Mean Median Mean Med. Mean Median Mean Median
1967-72   6.356 6.410 6.297 6.306 5.534 5.347 5.135 5.135 5.445 5.360 5.300 5.153 0.258 0.186 0.282 0.225 0.742 0.671
1973-81   
   
   
6.474 6.400 6.425 6.388 5.606 5.472 5.865 5.809 6.152 5.929 5.858 5.736 0.438 0.401 0.488 0.455 1.271 1.028
1982-87 4.920 4.883 4.915 4.873 5.248 5.035 3.633 3.626 4.370 4.196 5.087 4.894 0.265 0.191 0.318 0.265 0.718 0.625
1988-93 5.467 5.335 5.442 5.337 5.564 5.369 4.101 4.057 4.707 4.722 5.285 5.151 0.259 0.211 0.276 0.213 0.651 0.531
1994-99 5.763 5.384 5.746 5.353 5.775 5.559  4.085 3.831 4.679 4.319 5.291 5.024  0.214 0.148 0.219 0.160 0.554 0.420
1967-99      5.858 5.73 5.82 5.75 5.55 5.38 4.68 4.32 5.17 4.80 5.41 5.17 0.30 0.21 0.33 0.23 0.83 0.65
Diff     0.02 0.02 0.10 0.15      -0.57 -0.37 -0.97 -0.90      -0.04 -0.03 -0.62 -0.43
(p-value)     (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
 
Panel B.1. Age Distribution of Concept Stocks (Year 1972 excluded) 
Age 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 -- 20 21 -- 30 31 -- 40 41 -- 50 51 -- 60 61 -- 69 Total 
Count 1196                969 663 476 393 356 330 264 222 176 145 969 226 74 126 78 25 6688
Percent 17.88                 
                
14.49 9.91 7.12 5.88 5.32 4.93 3.95 3.32 2.63 2.17 14.49 3.38 1.11 1.88 1.17 0.37 100.00
 Cumulative % 17.88 32.37 42.28 49.40 55.28 60.60 65.54 69.48 72.80 75.43 77.60 92.09 95.47 96.58 98.46 99.63 100.00
 
 Panel B.2. Firm Age by Subperiods
 Concept Control All Firms
Period Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
1967-72 10.376 7.000 15.414 7.000 14.047 7.500
1973-81 
 
 
 
15.285 12.000 20.072 13.000 19.009 14.000
1982-87 5.272 2.000 12.954 12.500 14.724 12.500
1988-93 6.359 3.000 13.597 9.500 14.793 11.500
1994-99 3.639 2.000 13.142 8.500 12.310 6.000
1967-99 8.8 4.0 15.5 10.0 15.3 11.0
Diff     -7.63 -4.00 -7.59 -5.00
(p-value)     (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  – Continued – 
 
Panel B.3. Percentage of Concept Stocks That Are IPO Firms, by Subperiods   
Period # IPOs # Concepts Percentage
1967-72 94 927 10.14%
1973-81 
 
 
 
20 1248 1.60%
1982-87 303 1465 20.68%
1988-93 268 1305 20.54%
1994-99 523 1912 27.35%
1967-99 1208 6857 17.62%
 
Panel C: Debt, R&D, Advertising and Capital Expenditures               
 Long-Term Debt Ratio  R&D/Sales Adv/Sales Capex/Sales
 Concept Control All Firms  Concept Control All Firms Concept Control All Firms Concept Control All Firms
Period Mean Med. Mean Median
 
Mean Median  
    
Mean Med. Mean Median Mean Median  Mean Med. Mean Median MeanMedian  Mean Med. Mean Median Mean Median
1967-72 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.09 0.24 0.23 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.04
1973-81     
     
     
      
 
0.12 0.08 0.19 0.16 0.34 0.31 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.27 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.04
1982-87 0.05 0.01 0.17 0.12 0.23 0.19 0.24 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.29 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.05
1988-93 0.04 0.01 0.14 0.06 0.21 0.16 0.54 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.34 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.05
1994-99 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.03 0.17 0.09 0.80 0.34 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.39 0.17 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.05
1967-99 0.07 0.02 0.15 0.10 0.25 0.20 29.61% 4.00% 2.54% 0.00% 4.79% 0.00% 1.39% 0.003% 1.190% 0.001% 1.02% 0.001% 29.4% 12.0% 5.7% 3.8% 9.4% 4.6%
Diff     -0.09 -0.06 -0.19 -0.19      0.16 0.04 0.15 0.04     0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     0.21 0.09 0.18 0.07
(p-value)     (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     (0.06) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00)     (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
 
Panel D: Profitability and Liquidity Characteristics          
 Operating Margin  ROA  Profit Margin  
 Concept Control All Firms  Concept Control All Firms  Concept Control All Firms  
Period Mean Med. Mean Median Mean Median
 
 
 
Mean Med. MeanMedian MeanMedian Mean Med. MeanMedian MeanMedian  
 1967-72  0.30 0.26 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04
1973-81     
     
     
    
0.33 0.28 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05
1982-87 -0.18 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.11 -0.01 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.05 -0.28 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.04
1988-93 -0.65 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.11 -0.07 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.05 -0.82 0.06 0.04 0.05 -0.05 0.04
1994-99 -1.24 -0.57 0.12 0.12 -0.03 0.12  -0.23 -0.15 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.05  -1.44 -0.69 0.02 0.05 -0.14 0.04  
1967-99 -0.23 0.23 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.12 -0.01 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.06 -0.40 0.11 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.04
Diff     -0.59 0.10 -0.53 0.11      -0.12 -0.01 -0.09 0.03      -0.67 0.07 -0.60 0.07  
(p-value)     (0.003) (0.569) (0.004) (0.511)      (0.000) (0.010) (0.008) (0.930)      (0.001) (0.489) (0.001) (0.445)  
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  – Continued – 
 
Panel E: Percentage of Firms with Positive Earnings/Cash Flows       
             
 % of Firms with Positive Earnings  % of Firms with Positive Cash Flows
Period Concept Control All  Concept Control All   
1967-72 97.1 96.0 94.1    97.1 96.0 97.3  
1973-81 98.9 99.8 96.5    98.9 99.8 98.9  
1982-87 70.4 92.6 85.8    70.4 92.6 92.3  
1988-93 55.8 96.7 83.6    55.8 96.7 92.3  
1994-99 35.5 90.2 77.1     
 
35.5 90.2 86.5  
1967-99 74.0 95.5 88.2   74.0 95.5 93.9  
Diff                    
Mean  -28.1 -18.5     -28.1 -25.1  
(p-value)  (0.000) (0.001)     (0.000) (0.000)  
Median  -17.2 -7.9     -17.2 -14.2  
(p-value)   (0.000) (0.005)       (0.000) (0.000)  
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Trading Characteristics 
 
Panel A reports the number of firms associated with the frequency of being selected as concept stocks in our sample period. For example, 1095 firms 
appear as concept stocks once during our sample period, 529 firms twice, ... and so on. Panel B reports the probability of a stock moving between 
deciles from period t-1 to t. The sample universe consists of all nonfinancial firms in the intersection of CRSP monthly return files and the merged 
COMPUSTAT annual industrial files from 1965 to 1999. Firms with stock prices less than five dollars are deleted. Each year we sort all stocks in our 
sample universe and define concept stocks as the firms in the 91st to 100th percentile of market-to-sales ratio each year. The probability in Panel B is 
estimated as p(i,j) = n(i,j)/n(i) where n(i) is the number of firms in decile i at time t-1 and n(i,j) is the number of firms moving from decile i at time t-1 
to decile j at time t. Panel C reports the number of concept stocks based on exchanges. Trading volume (as average turnover) is defined as the annual 
average of monthly trading volume divided by shares outstanding for all concept stocks, control firms and the whole sample. "Diff" under Control 
Firms calculates the average/median difference of mean/median between concept stocks and control firms each year, and "Diff" under All Firms 
calculates the average/median difference of mean/median between concept stocks and all firms in the sample. P-values under Mean are associated with 
robust t-statistic using a two-sided t-test of no difference in mean each year. P-values under Median are associated with Wilcoxon signed rank test of 
no difference in median each year. 
 
Panel A: Number of Years Firms are Concept Stocks 
      
Number of Number of     
Years Firms Percentage Cumulative %
1 1095 44.08% 44.08%
2 529 21.30% 65.38%
3 287 11.55% 76.93%
4 174 7.00% 83.94%
5 91 3.66% 87.60%
6 69 2.78% 90.38%
7 62 2.50% 92.87%
8 33 1.33% 94.20%
9 31 1.25% 95.45%
10 23 0.93% 96.38%
11 14 0.56% 96.94%
12 20 0.81% 97.75%
13 12 0.48% 98.23%
14 10 0.40% 98.63%
15 8 0.32% 98.95%
16 8 0.32% 99.28%
17 3 0.12% 99.40%
18 4 0.16% 99.56%
19 2 0.08% 99.64%
21 1 0.04% 99.68%
22 4 0.16% 99.84%
23 1 0.04% 99.88%
24 2 0.08% 99.96%
26 1 0.04% 100.00%
Total 2484   
 
Panel B: Stability of Concept Stocks         
           
  Period t         
Period t-1 10(Concept) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
10(Concept) 0.694 0.221 0.050 0.018 0.008 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
9 0.115 0.459 0.269 0.090 0.040 0.015 0.008 0.003 0.002 0.001
8 0.013 0.172 0.374 0.249 0.105 0.049 0.021 0.010 0.005 0.002
7 0.003 0.042 0.181 0.334 0.238 0.116 0.054 0.020 0.010 0.003
6 0.002 0.013 0.060 0.188 0.310 0.242 0.112 0.050 0.018 0.005
5 0.001 0.004 0.023 0.071 0.194 0.303 0.248 0.109 0.038 0.008
4 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.027 0.081 0.192 0.318 0.259 0.096 0.017
3 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.010 0.026 0.081 0.206 0.357 0.259 0.056
2 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.021 0.061 0.202 0.453 0.250
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.011 0.038 0.185 0.760
Table 3.  – Continued – 
 
 
Panel C: Exchanges and Trading Volume             
                
    % of Concept Stocks % of  Firms on an exchange Trading Volume (Turnover)
 Number of Concept Stocks from various exchanges That are Concept Stocks Concept  Control All Firms 
Period NYSE  AMEX NASDAQ NYSE AMEX NASDAQ NYSE AMEX NASDAQ Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
1967-72   656 260 13 70.40% 28.16% 1.43% 10.37% 9.78% 4.87% 0.043 0.022 0.042 0.022 0.038 0.025
1973-81    
    65.05%
    
    
   
892 340 16 71.52% 27.19% 1.29% 9.68% 11.35% 7.09% 0.038 0.020 0.035 0.022 0.029 0.021
1982-87 358 153 957 24.45% 10.50% 5.33% 7.55% 16.49% 0.081 0.069 0.056 0.042 0.058 0.045
1988-93 287 125 896 23.08% 9.55% 67.36% 4.93% 10.02% 15.06% 0.127 0.092 0.086 0.062 0.078 0.050
1994-99 143 120 1653 7.53% 6.31% 86.16% 2.06% 9.45% 15.00% 0.230 0.165 0.151 0.103 0.128 0.087
1967-99 2336 998 3535 42.32% 17.33% 40.35% 6.77% 9.79% 11.28% 0.098 0.074 0.070 0.051 0.063 0.043
Diff                       0.014 0.016 0.019 0.013
(p-value)                       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Industry Distribution of Concept Stocks, 1967 ~ 1999 
 
We report the top 5 industries by ranking the number of concept stocks for industries with at least 3 concept stocks in the industry each year. We calculate the number of concept 
stocks for each industry each year. Firms with the same two-digit SIC codes (from CRSP) are categorized in the same industry. The industry with an asterisk (*) indicates that it is 
also among the top five IPO industries in that year. 
 
SIC Industry Name 1967 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
7 Agricultural Services                                  
10 Metal Mining 3                                 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 5 5 4
12 Coal Mining                                  
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 1 1                    1 2 1* 1 1 2* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 5* 5 4 4 4* 
20 Food and Kindred Products                                  
23 Apparel and Other Finished Products                                  
24 Lumber and Wood Products                                  
26 Paper and Allied Products                                  
27 Printing and Publishing             5                     5
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 2* 2* 2 1 1 2 2* 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 4* 2 1 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 1* 2* 3 
29 Petroleum and Coal Products                                  
30 Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products                                  
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, Concrete Products                                  
34 Fabricated Metal Products                                  5
35 Industrial, Computer, Office Equipment 5* 3* 3*                             4 4* 4* 5 3 3 4 3 4 1 2 5 5 4 5 5 5 5
36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment  5 5 4 3 5 5  4 4* 5*  3* 2* 2* 1* 3* 3* 4* 5* 5* 5*   4 4* 2* 2* 3* 4* 4 4 2* 
38 Instruments and Related Products  4* 3 5 2* 3* 4* 5*  5*  4* 5*   2* 3* 4* 3* 3* 3* 3* 2 3 2* 2* 2 4 4* 3* 3* 3  
39 Miscellan. Manufacturing Industries                                  
44 Water Transportation                                  
48 Communications (Multimedia)                                  5 5 5
49 Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 4                                 5 3 3 4 4
50 Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods                                  
51 Wholesale Trade-NonDurable Goods                                  
56 Apparel and Accessory Stores                                  
58 Eating and Drinking Places                                  
59 Miscellaneous Retail                                  
70 Hotels and Other Lodging Places                                  
73 Business Computer Related Services   5*         5*    3* 1* 1* 2* 2* 2* 2* 3* 2* 3* 3* 3* 3* 2* 2* 2* 1* 1* 
78 Motion Pictures                                  
79 Amusement & Recreation Services                                  
80 Health Services                                5* 5 5* 
82 Educational Services                                  
87 Engineering, Management & Research                              5 5  4 5* 4
Table 5.  Accounting Performance of Concept Stocks and Control Firms, 1967 ~ 1999 
 
We compare the accounting performance of concept stocks with that of control firms two years before and after the concept stocks are 
selected (Year 0).   Long-term debt ratio (LTD) is debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt divided by firm market size. Operating 
margin is defined as operating income before depreciation divided by sales. Return on assets is defined as operating income before 
depreciation divided by assets. Profit margin is net income divided by sales. Return on equity is operating income before depreciation 
divided by the sum of book value and preferred stock. Book values and market values not used in ratios are deflated using the CPI into 
1998 dollars. Control firms are chosen using a two-way matching procedure involving size and the book-to-market ratio. First, we 
identify the subset of matching candidates that have market values within 30% of a concept stock and are not concept stocks 
themselves in the previous two years. From this subset, the firm with the closest book-to-market ratio is chosen as the control firm. If 
the subset contains fewer than five candidate firms, we expand the range of market value to be within 40%. "Difference" calculates the 
mean/median difference between concept stocks and control firms each year. P-values under Mean, as reported in parentheses, are 
associated with robust t-statistic using a two-sided t-test of no difference in mean each year. P-values under Median are associated 
with Wilcoxon signed rank test of no difference in median each year. 
 
 
 
Panel A: Debt, R&D, Advertising and Capital Expenditures  
  
 LTD R&D/Sales Adv/Sales Capex/Sales
Year Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Concept Stocks  
-2 0.0747 0.0192 0.2767 0.0206 0.01093 0.00002 0.246 0.100 
-1 0.0639 0.0157 0.3334 0.0370 0.01208 0.00003 0.273 0.112 
0 0.0590 0.0127 0.3917 0.0536 0.01467 0.00004 0.313 0.131 
+1 0.0765 0.0219 0.3042 0.0440 0.01250 0.00002 0.260 0.110 
+2 0.0956 0.0319 0.2460 0.0366 0.01328 0.00001 0.225 0.100 
Control Firms  
-2 0.1577 0.1043 0.0246 0.0000 0.01501 0.00000 0.058 0.041 
-1 0.1517 0.0932 0.0280 0.0000 0.01201 0.00000 0.055 0.039 
0 0.1457 0.0929 0.0316 0.0000 0.01174 0.00000 0.056 0.038 
+1 0.1503 0.0995 0.0276 0.0000 0.01282 0.00000 0.061 0.041 
+2 0.1652 0.1158 0.0283 0.0000 0.01391 0.00000 0.063 0.042 
Difference (Concept - Control)  
-2 -0.0893 -0.0367 0.2422 0.0000 -0.00096 0.00000 0.194 0.054 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.290) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
-1 -0.0871 -0.0442 0.2620 0.0048 -0.00019 0.00000 0.212 0.068 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.797) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0 -0.0824 -0.0378 0.2709 0.0275 0.00200 0.00001 0.237 0.079 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
+1 -0.0701 -0.0348 0.2217 0.0127 -0.00056 0.00000 0.193 0.064 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.534) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
+2 -0.0676 -0.0359 0.1937 0.0226 -0.00076 0.00000 0.161 0.056 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.401) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 
 
Table 5.  – Continued – 
 
Panel B: Profitability Characteristics   
  
 Operating Margin ROA Profit Margin ROE
Year Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Concept Stocks  
-2 -0.121 0.220 0.113 0.158 -0.272 0.110 0.181 0.262
-1 -0.245 0.210 0.085 0.144 -0.394 0.106 0.127 0.228
0 -0.424 0.182 0.025 0.107 -0.590 0.094 0.003 0.164
+1 -0.193 0.202 0.071 0.140 -0.346 0.102 0.073 0.220
+2 -0.058 0.210 0.103 0.152 -0.212 0.102 0.154 0.248
Control Firms  
-2 0.127 0.122 0.194 0.193 0.045 0.051 0.475 0.376
-1 0.127 0.126 0.193 0.194 0.045 0.051 0.531 0.390
0 0.123 0.124 0.186 0.191 0.038 0.051 0.563 0.409
+1 0.135 0.129 0.198 0.199 0.054 0.056 0.622 0.394
+2 0.135 0.125 0.194 0.192 0.055 0.053 0.410 0.374
Difference (Concept - Control)  
-2 -0.227 0.120 -0.076 -0.019 -0.298 0.072 -0.296 -0.105
(0.028) (0.213) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.213) (0.000) (0.000)
-1 -0.290 0.111 -0.093 -0.040 -0.359 0.070 -0.350 -0.182
(0.010) (0.435) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.435) (0.000) (0.000)
0 -0.358 0.083 -0.120 -0.046 -0.440 0.061 -0.450 -0.192
(0.003) (0.720) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.733) (0.000) (0.000)
+1 -0.229 0.097 -0.103 -0.042 -0.304 0.054 -0.460 -0.174
(0.014) (0.430) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.510) (0.003) (0.000)
+2 -0.152 0.101 -0.080 -0.037 -0.228 0.052 -0.233 -0.135
 (0.052) (0.180) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.194) (0.000) (0.000)
 
 
Table 6.  Logistic Analysis of Concept Stocks versus Control Firms 
 
In the spirit of Fama and MacBeth, Logit regressions are estimated for each year of the 1967-99 period. The dependent variable takes 
one for concept stocks and zero otherwise. Firm age is defined as the difference between year of interest and the earliest year that the 
firm has traded stock price available in CRSP. Long-term debt (LTD) ratio is debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt divided by 
firm market size. Book value is total assets minus total liabilities and preferred stock. Firm book size is the natural logarithm of book 
value. Return on assets is defined as operating income before depreciation divided by assets. Return on equity is operating income 
before depreciation divided by the sum of book value and preferred stock. Nasdaq is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm stock 
trades in Nasdaq and zero if in NYSE/AMEX. Trading volume (as average turnover) is defined as the annual average of monthly 
trading volume divided by shares outstanding. Positive earnings is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm reports positive earnings 
in the selection year and zero otherwise. Following Fama and French (2001), we reports means of the regression estimates across 
years. Robust standard errors are computed using White (1980) procedure. P-values are in parentheses.  Marginal effects, evaluated at 
means, are reported in brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. – Continued – 
 
 
  Concepts versus All other firms Concepts versus Controls 
                     
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Size, age, exchange, and volume variables      
Firm age -0.011  -0.026    -0.051  -0.103   
 (0.011)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)   
 [-0.003]  [-0.007]    [-0.012]  [-0.021]   
Log(Book value)  -0.028  -0.084    -0.179  -0.544  
  (0.272)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.004)  
  [-0.007]  [-0.021]    [-0.044]  [-0.132]  
Nasdaq  -1.133  -0.584 -0.393  1.740  0.825 1.814 
  (0.130)  (0.296) (0.469)  (0.176)  (0.544) (0.108) 
  [-0.269]  [-0.144] [-0.098]  [0.386]  [0.201] [0.399] 
Trading volume  -0.680  -0.216    0.108  4.094  
  (0.440)  (0.852)    (0.952)  (0.113)  
  [-0.170]  [-0.054]    [0.027]  [0.983]  
Leverage, investment, advertising, and capital expenditure characteristics        
Long-term debt -11.90 -12.05 -13.57 -13.94 -14.88 -12.22 -13.16 -24.04 -25.91 -25.76 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 [-2.513] [-2.534] [-2.729] [-2.771] [-2.869] [-2.558] [-2.680] [-3.177] [-3.123] [-3.128] 
R&D/BV 6.183  6.174  8.232  10.278  8.788  11.989  14.167  14.391  24.273  18.743  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 [0.723] [0.724] [0.592] [0.430] [0.548] [0.311] [0.196] [0.187] [0.017] [0.067] 
Adv/BV -0.838 -0.827 -0.578 -0.811 -0.993 3.470 3.682 6.326 3.512 2.608 
 (0.294) (0.321) (0.570) (0.434) (0.281) (0.045) (0.042) (0.127) (0.363) (0.368) 
 [-0.210] [-0.207] [-0.144] [-0.203] [-0.248] [0.867] [0.920] [1.578] [0.877] [0.652] 
Capital expenditure 9.430  9.569  8.935  9.191  9.227  14.931  15.972  27.515  29.087  24.984  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 [0.522] [0.511] [0.562] [0.541] [0.538] [0.181] [0.143] [0.008] [0.006] [0.016] 
Book-to-market -7.452 -7.372 -8.235 -7.594 -7.781 -1.837 -1.882 -6.652 -5.249 -5.427 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 [-0.650] [-0.656] [-0.592] [-0.640] [-0.627] [-0.426] [-0.435] [-0.701] [-0.746] [-0.744] 
Profitability-related variables        
Return on assets     -3.629     -4.158 
     (0.000)     (0.000) 
     [-0.907]     [-1.039] 
Return on equity -2.055 -2.083 -2.219    -2.729 -2.775 -3.754   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
 [-0.514] [-0.521] [-0.555]    [-0.682] [-0.694] [-0.938]   
Positive earnings   0.842 -0.406     -1.298 -1.298  
   (0.270) (0.395)     (0.337) (0.394)  
   [0.191] [-0.099]     [-0.260] [-0.260]  
Intercept 1.429 1.404 -1.972 -1.481 -1.776 0.973 1.225 6.226 5.329 1.959 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.046) (0.149) (0.056) (0.000) (0.003) (0.023) (0.066) (0.376) 
            
Industry Dummy     Yes Yes Yes     Yes Yes Yes 
All regressions are significant at the 1% level.      
 
 
 
Table 7.  Calendar-Time Portfolio Regressions, 01/1967 ~ 12/1999. 
 
The dependent variable is the portfolio return of concept stocks, match firms or the zero investment portfolios.  The portfolio return is adjusted by the risk-free rate, 
if necessary. The zero investment portfolio is formed by going long in concept stocks and short in matching firms. Each month we form equal- and value-weighted 
portfolios containing all concept stocks chosen in the previous year. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly. Matching firms are drawn from the population of 
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq by matching size and book-to-market. MktRP, SMB, and HML are the Fama and French (1993) market, size, and book-to-market factors, 
respectively. PR1YR is Carhart (1997) momentum factor and is constructed as the return difference of all CRSP firms in the highest and the lowest treciles over the 
previous twelve months. Volume is calculated as the monthly trading volume divided by total shares outstanding (turnover ratio). Jan and Dec are January and 
December dummies. Hot is a dummy variable assigned to 1/0 in expansion/contraction months designated by NBER. Panel C reports the regression intercepts from 
Carhart four-factor models. Standard errors are computed using White (1980) robust estimator. p-values are in parentheses. 
 
                                  Panel A:  Equally-Weighted Portfolios 
Volume Volume
Portfolio   Inter.  MktRP SMB HML  PR1YR   (Concept)   (Match)  Jan Dec  Hot  Adj. Rsq
 
Concept -0.005 (0.007) 1.346 (0.000)                
                
                
                 
            
            
            
             
          
          
          
           
        
      
      
       
0.745
Control 0.019 (0.000) 1.257 (0.000) 0.785
Zero -0.024 (0.000) 0.089 (0.017) 0.017
    
Concept -0.002 (0.156) 1.025 (0.000) 0.709 (0.000) -0.673 (0.000) 0.883
Control 0.020 (0.000) 1.021 (0.000) 0.803 (0.000) -0.273 (0.000) 0.920
Zero -0.022 (0.000) 0.005 (0.901) -0.094 (0.099) -0.400 (0.000) 0.139
        
Concept -0.001 (0.286) 1.025 (0.000) 0.694 (0.000) -0.683 (0.000) -0.033 (0.450) 0.883
Control 0.019 (0.000) 1.020 (0.000) 0.840 (0.000) -0.250 (0.000) 0.078 (0.011) 0.922
Zero -0.021 (0.000) 0.004 (0.920) -0.146 (0.013) -0.432 (0.000) -0.111 (0.025) 0.154
          
Concept -0.002 (0.296) 1.024 (0.000) 0.696 (0.000) -0.680 (0.000) -0.031 (0.478) 0.008 (0.707) 0.883
Control 0.014 (0.000) 1.015 (0.000) 0.844 (0.000) -0.229 (0.000) 0.083 (0.007)  0.069 (0.005) 0.924
Zero -0.017 (0.000) -0.009 (0.826) -0.153 (0.007) -0.448 (0.000) -0.117 (0.021) -0.024 (0.725) -0.017 (0.861) 0.157
              
Concept 0.002 (0.565) 1.017 (0.000) 0.699 (0.000) -0.715 (0.000) 0.027 (0.543) 0.013 (0.553)  0.016 (0.001) -0.008 (0.079) -0.007 (0.053) 0.887
Control 0.022 (0.000) 1.016 (0.000) 0.849 (0.000) -0.244 (0.000) 0.109 (0.001)  0.090 (0.000) 0.007 (0.065) -0.001 (0.811) -0.012 (0.000) 0.929
Zero -0.021 (0.000) 0.000 (0.998) -0.155 (0.006) -0.468 (0.000) -0.084 (0.105) -0.018 (0.794) -0.036 (0.712) 0.008 (0.107) -0.007 (0.105) 0.005 (0.218) 0.164
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.  – Continued – 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Value-Weighted Portfolios                                   
Volume Volume
Portfolio     Inter. MktRP SMB HML  PR1YR   (Concept)   (Match)  Jan Dec  Hot  Adj. Rsq
  
Concept 0.006 (0.000) 1.148 (0.000)                
                
                002
                
            
            
            
             
          0.819
      0.836
Zero -0.007 (0.000) -0.095 (0.036) -0.110 (0.172) -0.402 (0.000) -0.130 (0.016)          0.080
                     
Concept 0.004 (0.019) 0.922 (0.000) -0.026 (0.648) -0.841 (0.000) -0.001 (0.984) 0.074 (0.002)        0.827
Control 0.008 (0.000) 1.022 (0.000) 0.067 (0.278) -0.421 (0.000) 0.126 (0.006)  0.170 (0.000)      0.851
Zero -0.004 (0.091) -0.110 (0.011) -0.071 (0.337) -0.427 (0.000) -0.118 (0.030) 0.152 (0.033) -0.289 (0.028)      0.109
                     
Concept 0.005 (0.035) 0.907 (0.000) -0.034 (0.547) -0.888 (0.000) 0.064 (0.188) 0.076 (0.001)  0.021 (0.000) -0.004 (0.289) -0.003 (0.193) 0.834
Control 0.017 (0.000) 1.025 (0.000) 0.074 (0.225) -0.435 (0.000) 0.147 (0.002)  0.192 (0.000) 0.006 (0.188) -0.001 (0.857) -0.012 (0.001) 0.855
Zero -0.011 (0.006) -0.126 (0.002) -0.087 (0.236) -0.459 (0.000) -0.076 (0.184) 0.145 (0.043) -0.296 (0.025) 0.015 (0.010) -0.004 (0.509) 0.008 (0.059) 0.120
0.701
Control 0.017 (0.000) 1.157 (0.000) 0.789
Zero -0.010 (0.000) -0.010 (0.795) -0.
     
Concept 0.010 (0.000) 0.938 (0.000) -0.051 (0.355) -0.853 (0.000) 0.820
Control 0.019 (0.000) 1.032 (0.000) -0.002 (0.968) -0.488 (0.000) 0.831
Zero -0.009 (0.000) -0.094 (0.034) -0.048 (0.511) -0.365 (0.000) -0.065
        
Concept
Control
0.011
0.018
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.938
1.032
(0.000) 
(0.000) 
-0.058
0.051
(0.336)
(0.443)
-0.857
-0.455
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.016
0.114
(0.739)
(0.018)     
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.  – Continued – 
 
 
 
Panel C: Coefficients of Intercepts From Zero-Investment Portfolios (Concept minus Control) Based on Various Subsamples 
      
  Equal-weighted   Value-weighted 
(I). Active concept and control firms (Still Active in 1999) 0.001 (0.425)  0.002 (0.297) 
(II). Firms with non-negative earnings 0.001 (0.321)  0.003 (0.112) 
(III). NYSE/AMEX Firms 0.001 (0.589)  -0.001 (0.511) 
(IV). NASDAQ Firms -0.005 (0.258)  -0.002 (0.665) 
(V). Years before 1981(<= 1981) -0.015 (0.000)  -0.008 (0.000) 
(VI). Years after 1981 (> 1981) -0.025 (0.000)  -0.007 (0.009) 
(VII). Non-IPO Firms -0.018 (0.000)  -0.014 (0.000) 
(VIII). IPO Firms -0.024 (0.000)  -0.022 (0.000) 
(IX). Non-SEO Firms 0.000 (0.858)  0.002 (0.322) 
(X). SEO Firms 0.001 (0.890)   -0.001 (0.817) 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.  Five-year buy-and-hold returns (BHRs) of concept stocks and their matching firms, 1967 - 1999. 
 
BHRs are calculated as the difference between the equal-weighted portfolio returns of concept stocks and control firms. The control firms are chosen 
using various two-way matching procedures. In all procedures, available benchmarks are CRSP firms, and are not concept stocks in the previous two 
years. The first three subsets of matching candidates are firms that have market values within 30% of the market value of the concept stock. In the first 
(second, third) procedure, the firm with the closest book-to-market ratio (earnings, cash flows) is chosen as the control firm. If the subset contains 
fewer than five candidate firms, we expand the range of market value to be within 40%. The fourth subset of matching candidates contains firms with 
the same 3-digit industry code as the concept stock. If the subset contains less than five firms, we include firms with the same 2-digit industry code. 
The firm with the closest equity market value to that of the concept stock is chosen as the control firm. The fifth procedure matches each concept 
stocks with the firm that has the same age and the closest book-to-market ratio. The other procedures constrain the sample based on other 
characteristics such as delisting, exchanges, time periods, IPOs, and SEOs. "Diff" reports the cross-sectional difference of buy-and-hold returns 
between the concept stocks and the control firms. The robust t-statistics, t(Diff), are calculated using a two-sided test of no difference. P-values are in 
parentheses.  
Panel A: Whole Sample               
Matching Procedure Year Concept (%) Control (%) Diff (%) t(Diff) p-value N
Size and Book-to-market 1 11.92% 14.24% -2.32% -1.89           (0.058) 6535
 2 19.00 24.84 -5.85 -2.71           (0.007) 6175
 3 30.69 38.10 -7.41 -1.99           (0.047) 5759
 4 46.11 64.98 -18.88 -4.55           (0.000) 5351
 5 64.55 77.15 -12.60 -2.91           (0.004) 4979
        
Size and Return on Equity 1 11.62% 14.61% -2.99% -2.47           (0.014) 6526
 2 19.21 29.27 -10.06 -4.59           (0.000) 6162
 3 31.09 46.42 -15.33 -4.11           (0.000) 5734
 4 44.87 70.22 -25.35 -6.80           (0.000) 5307
 5 66.90 97.59 -30.69 -6.46           (0.000) 4920
        
Size and Operating Margin 1 11.78% 10.40% 1.38% 1.22           (0.224) 6538
 2 20.17 32.02 -11.85 -5.38           (0.000) 6165
 3 30.87 52.01 -21.14 -5.41           (0.000) 5711
 4 44.38 77.06 -32.68 -9.86           (0.000) 5376
 5 65.50 104.02 -38.52 -7.64           (0.000) 4898
        
Industry and Size 1 12.18% 19.62% -7.44% -6.14           (0.000) 6483
 2 18.98 42.20 -23.22 -10.07           (0.000) 6107
 3 31.70 64.39 -32.69 -8.61           (0.000) 5681
 4 46.05 91.23 -45.18 -12.97           (0.000) 5248
 5 67.95 126.50 -58.55 -12.90           (0.000) 4851
        
Firm Age and Book-to-market 1 11.95% 15.91% -3.97% -3.10           (0.002) 6539
 2 18.58 25.47 -6.89 -3.25           (0.001) 6195
 3 30.47 40.43 -9.96 -2.60           (0.009) 5784
 4 46.57 68.67 -22.10 -4.94           (0.000) 5376
  5 64.83 83.58 -15.75 -3.97           (0.000) 4990
 
 
Panel B: Long-run Performance Based on Subsamples      
        
(I). Active concept and control firms (Still Active in 1999)     
Matching Procedure Year Concept (%) Control (%) Diff (%) t(Diff) p-value N
Size and Book-to-market 1 19.10% 15.92% 3.19% 1.68           (0.094) 3377
 2 29.07 29.60 -0.53 -0.14           (0.886) 3089
 3 44.81 47.11 -2.31 -0.32           (0.749) 2801
 4 57.46 67.65 -10.20 -1.54           (0.124) 2537
  5 82.41 87.37 -4.96 -0.61           (0.542) 2322
        
(II). Firms with non-negative earnings       
Matching Procedure Year Concept (%) Control (%) Diff (%) t(Diff) p-value N
Size and Book-to-market 1 13.34% 13.32% 0.02% 0.02           (0.987) 4357
 2 21.43 24.27 -2.84 -1.53           (0.125) 4227
 3 33.17 38.50 -5.33 -2.02           (0.043) 4096
 4 55.11 61.96 -6.85 -1.43           (0.153) 3940
  5 75.57 73.59 1.98 0.37           (0.712) 3768
 
 
Table 8.  – Continued – 
(III). NYSE/AMEX Firms        
Matching Procedure Year Concept (%) Control (%) Diff (%) t(Diff) p-value N
Size and Book-to-market 1 11.50% 10.74% 0.76% 0.67           (0.506) 3293
 2 21.03 21.29 -0.27 -0.14           (0.892) 3230
 3 31.86 33.70 -1.83 -0.72           (0.470) 3173
 4 50.10 51.34 -1.24 -0.33           (0.740) 3105
  5 71.30 70.87 0.43 0.08           (0.932) 3024
(IV). NASDAQ Firms        
Matching Procedure Year Concept (%) Control (%) Diff (%) t(Diff) p-value N
Size and Book-to-market 1 12.57% 16.15% -3.58% -1.60           (0.110) 3191
 2 16.12 25.65 -9.53 -2.40           (0.017) 2890
 3 29.01 43.17 13.15 -1.70           (0.090) 2538
 4 42.13 107.94 -65.81 -5.32           (0.000) 2200
  5 57.44 93.46 -36.02 -4.28           (0.000) 1902
(V). Years before 1981 (<= 1981)        
Matching Procedure Year Concept (%) Control (%) Diff (%) t(Diff) p-value N
Size and Book-to-market 1 11.44% 7.89% 3.55% 2.74           (0.006) 2019
 2 20.52 18.16 2.36 1.05           (0.295) 2011
 3 32.52 32.94 -0.42 -0.14           (0.890) 2002
 4 49.38 47.33 2.06 0.52           (0.601) 1987
  5 68.64 66.06 2.59 0.50           (0.615) 1973
(VI). Years after 1981 (> 1981)        
Matching Procedure Year Concept (%) Control (%) Diff (%) t(Diff) p-value N
Size and Book-to-market 1 12.14% 17.08% -4.94% -2.95           (0.003) 4516
 2 18.26 28.07 -9.81 -3.26           (0.001) 4164
 3 29.72 40.85 -11.14 -2.03           (0.042) 3757
 4 44.17 75.41 -31.24 -5.07           (0.000) 3364
  5 61.86 84.43 -22.57 -3.57           (0.000) 3006
(VII). Non-IPO Firms        
Matching Procedure Year Concept (%) Control (%) Diff (%) t(Diff) p-value N
Size and Book-to-market 1 14.16% 16.71% -2.55% -1.96           (0.050) 6334
 2 20.07 30.74 -10.67 -5.15           (0.000) 6090
 3 28.71 45.88 -17.16 -6.86           (0.000) 5808
 4 45.49 67.63 -22.14 -5.47           (0.000) 5544
  5 64.67 83.16 -18.49 -4.31           (0.000) 5237
(VIII). IPO Firms        
Matching Procedure Year Concept (%) Control (%) Diff (%) t(Diff) p-value N
Size and Book-to-market 1 9.71% 12.53% -2.82% -0.74           (0.460) 1305
 2 20.07 21.43 -1.35 -0.18           (0.860) 1166
 3 43.26 36.89 6.36 0.35           (0.728) 1009
 4 28.35 43.94 -15.58 -1.76           (0.079) 846
  5 49.67 53.09 -3.43 -0.29           (0.771) 712
(IX). Non-SEO Firms       
Matching Procedure Year Concept (%) Control (%) Diff (%) t(Diff) p-value N
Size and Book-to-market 1 3.32% 13.47% -10.15% -5.26           (0.000) 887
 2 7.31 25.65 -18.35 -6.21           (0.000) 985
 3 16.19 40.38 -24.18 -6.38           (0.000) 1039
 4 27.66 50.14 -22.48 -5.05           (0.000) 1071
  5 47.20 69.18 -21.98 -3.19           (0.002) 1064
(X). SEO Firms       
Matching Procedure Year Concept (%) Control (%) Diff (%) t(Diff) p-value N
Size and Book-to-market 1 26.96% 15.00% 11.96% 5.99           (0.000) 2228
 2 42.86 30.29 12.57 3.47           (0.001) 1961
 3 58.85 42.64 16.22 3.40           (0.001) 1754
 4 82.70 71.76 10.93 1.37           (0.170) 1598
  5 115.12 91.77 23.36 2.55           (0.011) 1378
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9.  Five-year buy-and-hold returns (BHRs) of concept stocks and their matching firms sorted by the book-
to-market ratios and the past 3-year returns 
 
BHRs are calculated as the difference between the equal-weighted portfolio returns of concept stocks and control firms. "Diff" reports the cross-
sectional difference of buy-and-hold returns between the concept stocks and the control firms. The robust t-statistics, t (Diff), are calculated using a 
two-sided test of no difference. P-values are in parentheses.  
 
Panel A. The book-to-market ratio 
 
Rank: BV/MV 1 (Low)     
Year Concept (%) Control (%) Diff (%) t(Diff) p-value 
1 11.57% 13.87% -2.31% -1.67 (0.095) 
2 17.06 22.42 -5.36 -2.44 (0.015) 
3 29.73 34.46 -4.73 -1.00 (0.317) 
4 43.40 56.43 -13.03 -2.77 (0.006) 
5 64.62 72.88 -8.27 -1.56 (0.120) 
      
Rank: BV/MV 2     
Year Concept (%) Control (%) Diff (%) t(Diff) p-value 
1 11.09% 14.24% -3.15% -0.88 (0.378) 
2 25.17 32.99 -7.82 -0.72 (0.471) 
3 33.15 45.74 -12.59 -1.57 (0.117) 
4 43.66 63.98 -20.32 -2.34 (0.020) 
5 77.20 82.40 -5.19 -0.34 (0.731) 
      
Rank: BV/MV 3 (High)     
Year Concept (%) Control (%) Diff (%) t(Diff) p-value 
1 19.74% 21.41% -1.67% -0.30 (0.766) 
2 26.32 36.39 -10.06 -1.17 (0.243) 
3 52.69 61.01 -8.32 -0.44 (0.664) 
4 74.88 94.79 -19.91 -0.90 (0.371) 
5 85.48 130.77 -45.29 -1.76 (0.081) 
 
Panel B. The past 3-year returns 
 
Rank: Pr3yr 1 (Low)     
Year Concept (%) Control (%) Diff (%) t(Diff) p-value 
1 7.13% 14.21% -7.08% -2.79 (0.005) 
2 25.08 27.59 -2.51 -0.35 (0.729) 
3 43.55 41.71 1.84 0.12 (0.903) 
4 44.06 60.51 -16.44 -2.25 (0.025) 
5 66.37 81.88 -15.51 -1.47 (0.143) 
      
Rank: Pr3yr 2     
Year Concept (%) Control (%) Diff (%) t(Diff) p-value 
1 11.06% 14.27% -3.21% -1.49 (0.137) 
2 12.06 19.03 -6.97 -2.47 (0.014) 
3 30.09 29.21 0.88 0.15 (0.879) 
4 42.38 51.55 -9.17 -1.31 (0.190) 
5 58.09 62.29 -4.20 -0.64 (0.525) 
      
Rank: Pr3yr 3 (High)     
Year Concept (%) Control (%) Diff (%) t(Diff) p-value 
1 13.87% 13.78% 0.10% 0.05 (0.958) 
2 19.67 25.44 -5.78 -2.01 (0.045) 
3 25.39 39.26 -13.87 -3.66 (0.000) 
4 45.92 65.45 -19.53 -2.71 (0.007) 
5 71.61 82.03 -10.42 -1.33 (0.184) 
 
 
 
Table 10. Determining the success of concept stocks 
 
The Fama-MacBeth regressions are performed cross-sectionally each year and then the average of the time series of each coefficient is 
calculated. The dependent variable is the cumulative five-year buy-and-hold return for each concept stock. Firm's market value is the 
market capitalization of common stock at calendar year-end. Firm age is defined as the difference between year of interest and the 
earliest year that the firm has traded stock price available in CRSP. Long-term debt (LTD) ratio is debt in current liabilities plus long-
term debt divided by firm market size. Book value is total assets minus total liabilities and preferred stock. Firm book size is the 
natural logarithm of book value. Returns on assets is defined as operating income before depreciation divided by assets. Returns on 
equity is operating income before depreciation divided by the sum of book value and preferred stock. Nasdaq is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the firm stock trades in Nasdaq and zero if in NYSE/AMEX. Trading volume (as average turnover) is defined as the 
annual average of monthly trading volume divided by total shares outstanding.  SEO dummy is equal to one if the firm has a positive 
stock issuance. Positive earnings is a dummy variable if returns on earnings is positive for the firm and zero otherwise. Industry 
dummy variables are constructed at the 2-digit SIC level.  High (Low) market-to-sales dummy is equal to one if the firm’s market-to-
sales ratio is at the top (bottom) thirty-three percent among concept stocks.  P-values (in parentheses) are associated with White (1980) 
robust standard errors. 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Size, age, exchange, volume, and SEO variables     
Firm age -0.006  -0.002   
 (0.141)  (0.395)   
Log(Book value)  0.051  0.071  
  (0.257)  (0.133)  
Nasdaq  -0.144  -0.311 -0.273 
  (0.384)  (0.034) (0.074) 
Trading volume  -1.395  -1.449  
  (0.128)  (0.142)  
SEO dummy 0.282 0.199 0.291 0.202 0.256 
 (0.012) (0.040) (0.008) (0.042) (0.017) 
Leverage, investment, advertising, and capital expenditure characteristics   
Long-term debt -0.45 -0.68 0.05 -0.37 0.09 
 (0.141) (0.053) (0.910) (0.443) (0.849) 
R&D/BV 0.581  0.833  2.083  2.058  1.794  
 (0.205) (0.031) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) 
Adv/BV 2.797 2.897 1.137 1.388 1.256 
 (0.231) (0.229) (0.621) (0.559) (0.602) 
Capital expenditure -0.011 -0.028 -0.058 -0.071 -0.067 
 (0.947) (0.849) (0.674) (0.605) (0.629) 
Book-to-market 0.320 0.213 0.265 0.112 0.249 
 (0.078) (0.269) (0.166) (0.562) (0.157) 
Low market-to-sales dummy -0.036 -0.010 -0.012 0.008 -0.011 
 (0.672) (0.909) (0.894) (0.929) (0.898) 
High market-to-sales dummy 0.016 -0.024 0.082 0.061 0.059 
 (0.816) (0.738) (0.314) (0.460) (0.469) 
Profitability-related variables      
Return on assets     0.484 
     (0.009) 
Return on equity 0.399 0.321 0.496   
 (0.052) (0.093) (0.062)   
Positive earnings   0.163 0.181  
   (0.505) (0.490)  
Intercept 0.419 0.288 -0.018 -0.046 0.216 
  (0.017) (0.157) (0.958) (0.877) (0.320) 
Industry Dummy   Yes Yes Yes 
Average Adjusted R2 0.074 0.090 0.125 0.141 0.130 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
As background for u
throug
the word ‘concept(s)’ where ‘sto
nderstanding concept stocks, we searched the Dow Jones News Retrieval over the 1965
h 1999 period for all articles related to concept stocks.  In particular, we identify all articles mentioning
ck(s)’ was within five words.  We identified over 350 articles.25  We then 
examine each of these articles and eliminate those that are irrelevant.26  Many of the remaining articles 
comment on the wisdom (or lack thereof) of investing in concept stocks.  These articles typically define 
concept stocks as those with extremely high price–to-earnings or price-to-sales ratios.  The vast majority of 
articles do not give sufficient detail to classify a particular concept.  Twenty-eight articles, however, from as 
far back as 1973, specifically identify a stock or industry as concept stocks.  An overview of the concepts 
identified by these articles is contained in Table A. 27  The table identifies the source and date of the article as 
well as the companies or industries involved.  We have added the CRSP SIC codes of the concept industries 
and noted key excerpts of the text.   
                                                     
25 A similar analysis of Lexis-Nexis identified a few additional concepts including, riverboat gambling, profiting from 
the Olympic games, Y2K problems, and China entering the World Trade Organization. 
26 For example, articles discussing the “concept of stock valuation” were deleted as were other instances where the words 
concept and stock appeared but were unrelated to stocks with high valuations difficult to explain by current 
fundamentals. 
27 A large number of articles appearing in 1998 and 1999 used the phrases concept stock inter-changeably with the 
discussion of Internet or technology stocks.  These are not included in Table A. 
 
 
Table A.  Summary of Search Results from Dow Jones News Retrieval Over the 1965 Through 2000 Period. 
 
We report the search results from Dow Jones News Retrieval over the 1965 through 2000 period. We search major newswire, newspapers, magazines, and trade 
journals as defined by Dow Jones & Company. The key words are concept(s) where stock(s) was within five words. To save space, we only report the results up to 
1997 because during the period of 1998 to 2000, most articles use concept stocks and Internet-related stocks interchangeably. This table reports the articles 
mentioning either concept industries or companies with concept stocks, or both. SIC codes are from CRSP. Key quotes are excerpted from the articles.  
 
Date       Publisher1 Industry Mentioned Company Mentioned SIC  Key Quotes          
09/09/1973  NYT     Syntex   2834 … concept stocks are generally nourished by exciting business ideas … 
      Bausch & Lomb  3861   
     Levitz Furniture  5712  
      Robbins A H  2834  
12/15/1973  Forbes Railroads  Union Pacific  4011 Are … railroads the concept stocks of tomorrow? … Look at … 
      Southern Railway 4011 the inherent quality … 
      Norfolk & Western 4011  
06/10/1980  NYT  Precious Metal  Hecla Mining  1041 Precious metal issues … as long-term inflation hedges. 
   Energy   Homestake Mining 1041  
      Dome Mines  1041  
      Callahan Mining  1044  
      Day Mines  1041  
      Tejon Ranch    211  
      ASA Ltd.  6723  
      Asarco Inc.  3356  
09/26/1983  Barron's Medical Practice  American Surgery Centers 8080 Firms with outpatient surgery … have been anointed ‘concept stocks.’ 
      Medical 21  8011  
      Surgery Centers Corp 8090  
01/21/1985  Barron's Retail --Warehouse Home Depot  5211 Warehouse notion is the hottest thing in retailing … 
03/11/1985  Forbes    McDonald's  5812 … baby boomers … are … likely to purchase … stocks in companies 
       Apple Computer  3573 they grew up with. Concept stocks. Stocks with plenty of growth 
       The Limited  5621 potential. 
       Wal-Mart  5311  
   Lorimar   7814  
   The Gap Stores  5651  
   Wherehouse Entertainment5733  
       U.S. Surgical Corp. 3840  
05/09/1988  NYT  Steel   Bethlehem Steel  3312 U.S. steel makers see growing demand. 
      Deere   3523  
      Caterpiller  3531 
 
 
Table A. – Continued – 
 
Date       Publisher1 Industry Mentioned Company Mentioned SIC  Key Quotes          
05/29/1989  Barron's Cellular telephones     … one area we shy away from are the concept stocks, the stocks that 
   Cable-television      are currently losing money and will continue to lose money in the near 
  Technology      future, but are supposedly going to earn small fortunes sometime in the  
   Biotechnology      ‘Nineties. 
02/27/1990  Globe Waste management Waste Management Inc. 4953 … Waste-management stocks look good, perhaps too good, at the  
      Browning-Ferris Industries4953 present time. 
04/30/1990  WSJ  Technology  Integrated Systems 7370 “Every once in a while, the market gives you a chance to be brave,”… 
          A “concept” stock with little history … it’s expensive at 40. But its  
          Product … will be in demand. 
06/05/1990  WP  Service   Urcarco Inc.  6141  What makes Urcarco worth all this money? Certainly not anything 
visible on the financial statements. … What you are really paying for here 
is a concept. … bringing professional management to … the  
$40 billion used car business. 
06/25/1990  Forbes Service   Fuddruckers  5810 You could tell it was a concept stock because the financials were so         
   Pharmaceutical  Vipont Pharmaceutical 2830 bad. … The earnings were paltry and the market capitalization was out 
 Service   Tiffany & Co.   3911 of proportion to everything but management’s promises. 
01/21/1991  Forbes Medical Practice  Neurogen Corp.  2830 … will be more effective than … Valium and … Prozac. 
02/01/1993  Forbes Casual Dining  Fresh Choice  5810 … these are concept stocks. You aren’t buying earnings or assets. 
      Lone Star Steakhouse 5810 Concepts are moonbeams. And who is to say what a moonbeam is 
      Cracker Barrel  5810    worth? 
03/09/1993  WSJ  Biotechnology  Chiron   2830 … all three have solid near-term earnings potential, more than one  
     Genzyme  2830 revenue-producing drug, and promising new-product pipelines. … “A 
      Biogen   2830 lot of investors burnt by ‘single-concept’ stocks are pouring money 
          into Chiron,” … 
07/12/1993  BW  Multimedia  Walt Disney  7812 Walt Street often swoons over “concept” stocks, and multimedia -- the 
    Viacom   4841 combination of computers, telecommunications, audio, and video into 
      Acclaim Entertainment 7372 a powerful system in every home -- is one heck of a concept.  
     Broderbund Software 7370  
      Electronic Arts  7370  
      NTN Communications 7389  
    America Online   7375  
12/27/1993  BW  Health Care      A resuscitation of health-care stocks … should help drive small caps in 
          the year ahead. 
 
 
Table A. – Continued – 
 
Date       Publisher1 Industry Mentioned Company Mentioned SIC  Key Quotes          
01/03/1994  Forbes Telecommunications     “… Small concept stocks … are almost a sure bet” for decline. …   
   Multimedia      Watch out for … current buzzwords … Payoffs are way in the future,  
                 and nobody knows who, if anyone, will be the winners. 
10/16/1994  Dallas    IBM2   3571 “The really good ones usually come out early in the cycle … Everyone  
      Xerox2   3861 has a story … but it’s difficult to translate into companies that will  
      Microsoft2  7370 grow over time. 
 Biotechnology2    
   Semiconductors2    
 Computers2   
04/06/1995  IBD  Medical Practice  InPhyNet  8090 … it’s really a new industry in the sense that nobody really organized 
          … doctors on a large basis before. So, they’re really concept stocks. 
10/10/1995  FP  Entertainment  IMAX   7990 One analyst … is so impressed he won’t give a target price. … “The  
      Iwerks3   7990 upside’s wide open. It’s very large.” 
01/01/1996  Forbes    Netscape  7370 Netscape is trading at a P/E of 375 and America Online at 41. One is 
      America Online   7375  discounting the hereafter, the other is discounting eternity. 
      Spyglass  7370 
03/04/1996  Fortune Emerging Technology     How do you judge what is good value in emerging technology 
      companies? … I don’t buy concept stocks. If it’s a software company 
      we look at price-to-sales. 
03/11/1996  Forbes Technology  Netscape  7370 Once again we heard the “this time it’s different” two-step from many 
      UUNet   4810 analysts and market strategists. Tech stocks, the general consensus said, 
  Compaq   7379 would continue their torrid climb because multinational demand would 
  Intel   3679 increase rapidly for years. Whenever they say “this time it’s different,” 
  Texas Instruments 3674 tighten your grip on your wallet. 
  Philips Electronics NV 6711  
05/06/1996  Forbes    “trendy stocks”   … why do people keep flocking to growth and concept stocks selling 
          at huge premiums…? Because emotion favors the premium-priced  
          stocks. They are fashionable. They are hot. They make great cocktail 
          party chatter. There is an impressive and growing body of evidence 
          demonstrating that investors and speculators don’t necessarily learn 
          from experience. Emotion overrides logic time after time. 
 
 
Table A. – Continued – 
 
Date       Publisher1 Industry Mentioned Company Mentioned SIC  Key Quotes          
07/14/1996  WP     Polaroid Corp.4  3861 These are young, high-technology, high-concept stocks that have little 
       Walt Disney4  7812 profit but lots of potential – and lots of hype from investment firms and 
  Avon Products4  2844 newsletters. 
  Presstek   2750  
08/05/1996  Fortune Biotech       … concept stocks – companies in areas like biotech and Internet 
   Internet services      services that have great ideas but no actual profit. 
10/14/1996  Barron's    Novatek International 3440 Concept stocks, by their very nature, fire investors’ imagination and 
          dull their critical faculties. 
12/16/1996  Forbes    America Online   7375 Anyone remember the two-tier market of the early 1970s, when the  
  Intuit   7370 Nifty Fifty rose into never-never land? Large institutional investors 
  Presstek   2750 lined up to buy the fastest-growing big-cap stocks – the Avons, 
  Yahoo! Inc.  7375 Xeroxes, Polaroids – whose futures were guaranteed by the experts 
  Netscape  7370 of the day. … like the two-tier market of the 1970s, today’s mania for 
  Excite   7370 concept stocks will end in a stampede for the exits. 
  PeopleSoft  7370  
  Total System Services 6153  
  Cascade Communications 3670  
  Ascend Communications 7370  
01/22/1997  WSJ     Loral   3679   … a large part of the stock’s price is a tribute to … starry-eyed visions  
          of emerging satellite businesses, which they don’t really know how to 
          value. 
02/17/2000  WSJ     VerticalNet  7310 Concepts are “castles in the air” by definition, so how does Mr. Bogle 
      Leap Wireless Intl. 3660 quantify concept stocks? … First, the stocks have extremely high price- 
      Geoworks  7370    to-sales ratios. Price to earnings ratios won’t work because these  
      ZixIt   3670 companies so often are losing money. 
      General Magic  7373  
      Sunrise Technologies 3840    
       
1 NYT: New York Times.  Globe: The Globe and Mail.  WSJ: Wall Street Journal.  WP: The Washington Post.  BW: Business Week.  Dallas: The Dallas Morning News.  IBD: 
Investor’s Business Daily.  FP: The Financial Post.    
2 These companies were NOT chosen as concept stocks at that time (1994). Instead, “…Finding the great growth stock is always the dream. In the ‘50s it was IBM; in the ‘60s it was 
Xerox; more recently it has been Microsoft. Probably the future will have other technology-based companies.” … “Most concept stocks do terribly – look at biotech, semiconductors 
and computers.” 
3 Iwerks was considered by the writer as a past concept stock. “ … Iwerks Entertainment Inc., proved to be one of the biggest duds as far as concept stocks go.” 
4 These companies were NOT chosen as concept stocks at that time (1996). Instead, “In what was called the ‘two-tier market’ of the 1970s, Investors went wild over a few blue-chip 
stocks … Shares of such companies as Polaroid Corp., Walt Disney Co. and Avon Products Inc. went through the roof while the vast majority of stocks languished.” 
 
